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Abstract
Adolescent exposure to political conflict is inevitable in today‘s world. The dynamics of
these conflicts are highly variable, as are the roles of adolescents within them. In addition,
adolescents are experiencing developmental processes, notably identity formation from both
internal and external perspectives. The purpose of this study was to examine adolescents in two
divergent conflict environments (Palestinian and Bosnian) and to evaluate the impact of exposure
and identity on psychosocial outcomes, as well as the impact of exposure on identity itself.
Results show that the association between identity and negative psychosocial outcomes was
positive, as hypothesized, and the same across both groups. Also, as predicted, the correlation
between identity and negative psychosocial outcomes was negative and the same across both
groups. Of most interest, however, the correlation between exposure to conflict and identity was
positive for Palestinians and negative for Bosnians as hypothesized based on study of the varying
conditions of conflict these two groups experienced. Thus, higher conflict exposure was
associated with higher identity formation for Palestinian youths, while higher conflict exposure
was associated with lower identity formation for Bosnian youths.
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Introduction
As war becomes a media commodity, international attention focuses on conflict zones
and those affected within them. Currently there are more than 40 countries dealing with armed
conflict. One area of great concern is youths‘ roles in the conflicts. Over the past decade, the UN
estimates 2 million children have been killed in armed conflict, 6 million permanently disabled,
and currently approximately 250,000 are serving as child soldiers
(www.un.org/children/conflict/english/themostgraveviolations.html, retrieved 4/21/08).

Diversity of Youth Experience with Political Conflict
While these statistics paint a picture of youth as merely passive victims of conflict, youth
in fact take on a multitude of roles within conflict zones (Barber, 2009a). Children and youth are
directly exposed to, participate in, and experience the consequences of war. Importantly, their
experiences vary widely between conflicts as individual wars differ dramatically on how they are
waged and how individuals experience them. Recently, much media attention (but little research)
has focused on youth conscribed into service in political conflict (i.e. child soldiers). However,
most youth are involved in conflict in ways other than conscribed soldierhood. Some youth are
passive victims of the violence of conflict, while in other conflicts youth voluntarily participate
in the fighting, often motivated by a desire to share in a popular movement within their society.
The experiences and exposures for youth living in these and other differing conflicts are wide
ranging and need to be examined with respect to their distinctness.
This distinctiveness is particularly evident when comparing the Palestinian/Israeli
conflict (1987-1993) with the Bosnian/Serbian conflict (1992-1996).Youths‘ experience in these
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two conflicts was significantly different. From the initial perspective of conflict onset, the
preparedness of youth for conflict was high for Palestinians and low for Bosnians. Palestinian
youth grew up understanding the historical conflict between their people and Israel. Many were
living as refugees and most believed in the necessity of struggle to achieve their perceived rights.
Bosnian youth did not expect, nor understand, the causes of the conflict within which they found
themselves. Moreover the secular, integrated, society they had grown up in did not provide a
basis for them to understand the sudden immersion in a conflict environment (Barber, 2008).
With respect to exposure to violence, Palestinian youth experienced high levels of home
and school raids, as well as commonly reporting humiliating tactics employed by the Israeli army
against fathers and other males within families. Bosnian youth reported little experience with
these types of political violence. Instead, Bosnian youth reported more destruction of property,
killing of their family and neighbors, and more frequently being shot at than Palestinian youth.
The personal level of attack experienced by Palestinian youth appeared to lead them to be more
passionate towards engagement in the conflict itself. Bosnian youth experienced an unpredictable
conflict with little explanation as to why they were being attacked. And even if they felt the
desire to become involved, they did not have an opportunity to engage in resistance (Barber,
2008).
Thus, the variation between these two conflict experiences is expressed in both the
structural exposure/involvement of youth and the meaning created by the youth to explain the
conflict (Barber, 2009b). These differences make for a clear comparison and a good example of
the diversity of conflict experience. These two conflicts will be emphasized in this thesis to
provide examples from two specific and unique contexts.

3
Research on Conflict Youth
Traditionally, conflict youth have been studied using a deficit model, whereby
researchers have sought to identify the negative consequences of political violence on youth
functioning (Barber & Schluterman, 2009). Despite the predominant focus on negative
functioning, findings from this body are mixed, with most studies finding links between conflict
involvement and negative functioning, others finding no prediction of youth functioning, and a
few finding conflict experiences to predict enhanced psychosocial functioning. Thus, in addition
to the variation in conflict experience described in the preceding section, there is variation in
how youth respond to political violence. We need to better understand how and why conflict
experience leads to negative outcomes as well as the mechanisms that lead to divergent outcomes
in youth from different conflicts. This thesis will focus on youth identity as one such mechanism
of explaining how conflict impacts youth functioning.

Adolescent Identity as an Explanatory Factor
The development of a consolidated identity is classically considered the prime task of
adolescence, particularly among Western cultures (Erikson, 1988). However, the study of
conflict adolescents has largely overlooked this key developmental process when considering if,
when, or why conflict impacts adolescents.
Identity is considered consolidated when an individual develops a stable sense of self
within a cultural framework (Erikson, 1988). The construction of a stable sense of identity is
driven by internal needs for several factors. Primarily, a drive to maintain and enhance positive
self-esteem leads one to seek out a ‗self,‘ particularly one that is coherent across time and place.
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In addition, the seemingly polar factors of uniqueness and belonging—a sense of individuality
within a community—spurs the development of a ‗self‘. Efficacy, or a sense of purpose in
addition to a significance or meaning behind that purpose are also integral to consolidated
identity (Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006). If these goals are not met, the
adolescent can experience diffusion, apathy and disinterest in a central identity (Schwartz, Cote,
& Arnett, 2005).
Much of the early research in the field of identity was largely centered on internal (i.e.,
psychological) processes of development. However, identity construction does not occur in a
vacuum. Cultural environments shape the individual, and vice versa (Shweder & Sullivan, 1993).
A culture‘s unique psychology comes from historical contexts, social structure, and economic
conditions (Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, & Maynard, 2003; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993).
Individual development includes searching for a balance between autonomy and relatedness
within one‘s community. The seeming universality of seeking a sense of self that fits into salient
communities is key to the adolescent experience, even though cultural context is highly varied
(Greenfield et al., 2003). Group membership contributing to a sense of belongingness within a
community is primary to an achieved identity (as in social identity: Tajfel, 1982; and collective
identity: Coleman, & Lowe, 2007; Simon, & Klandermans, 2001).
At a basic, internal, level identity formation is related to the exploration of existential
issues (Duriez, Smits, & Goossens, 2008). Still, the practical, experiential, ability to explore
political affiliation or religion outwardly varies for different socio-cultural conflicts. A sense of a
coherent self is developed through many sources including individual factors, and importantly,
social factors. Individuals create social systems that support their sense of self-concept,

5
functioning as esteem support, a previously identified mainstay need influencing identity
consolidation (Ethier & Deaux, 1994).

Salience of Identity for Conflict Youth
When attempting to examine adolescents undergoing identity development in conflict
environments, it is particularly important to emphasize that identity construction does not occur
only internally, isolated from external influences. Moreover, conflict environments are not
uniform. The cultural environment prior to conflict experience may prepare adolescents for
conflict through tradition and history, as in the Palestinian experience, or adolescents may be
caught off guard, as in the Bosnian experience.
Adolescents in conflict situations are confronted with establishing a commitment to
cultural factors, political factors, and often religious factors above and beyond their creation of
an individual sense of self. Given developmental growth, adolescents are expected to be in the
formative stages of identity formation. However, youth in conflict zones may necessarily be
more advanced in their identity consolidation due to the climate they experience. Selfidentification from a cultural perspective may be more salient for these groups, particularly if
they are being persecuted based on their political or religious positions. This makes conflict a
prime context to study the functionality of identity formation, as it is influenced by socio-cultural
factors as described in the preceding section.
For adolescents experiencing conflict, particularly in the Palestinian and Bosnian
conflicts, political factors and religious beliefs are salient aspects of daily life. The political and
religious undertones, or overtones, of a conflict further increase the salience of these factors for
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adolescents (Ethier & Deaux, 1994). The protective nature of collective or group identity may
increase as an adolescent better understands his or her in-group through transmission of culture
from older generations (Ethier & Deaux, 1994). Importantly, however, this protective factor
arises out of the adolescents‘ ability to attribute meaning to their situation – an ability that varied
substantially between Bosnian and Palestinian youth, with the former failing to make historical,
political, religious, or cultural meaning out of their conflict, but the latter attributing rich and
broad meaning in these realms (Barber, 2009b). While foreclosure (i.e. premature adoption of
adult‘s beliefs; Marcia, 1966) is considered a negative identity status for adolescents in nonconflict environments, adherence to or consolidation with parental social or political agendas
may be normative and functional for adolescents joining popular movements. As Schachter
(2004) theorized, such adolescents may form configurations that are responsive to the
complexity of their experiences.
Perhaps a swift identity consolidation is influenced by meaning making, particularly in
the realms of religion and politics (which drive the conflict in many cases). For adolescents
experiencing conflict, this consolidation could lead to less confusion caused by the conflict, and
a more positive, resilient outcome fulfilling the purposes of identity though following a different
process frame. Creating a meaningful self-system which structures definitions of the
environment gives the youth coherent tasks and dictates that an understanding of the role of
others is basic to developing positive self-esteem (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
It is evident in the literature that environmental factors influence identity formation, but
given that conflicts are experienced differently by youth, identity formation may be influenced to
differing degrees or in different ways by those environmental factors, particularly political
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engagement and religiosity. In other words, differences in experience may dictate the
relationship between exposure, identity and outcome.
The unique construction of identity and the protective function it may serve as
adolescents generate meaning within their environment makes it an important factor for
consideration within exposure/outcome models. Identity may help to explain how exposure to
political conflict impacts adolescents‘ psychosocial functioning; in other words, an intervening
variable between exposure and outcomes. The first purpose of this study is to examine the
relationship between conflict exposure and psychological outcomes and explore how it might be
partially explained by a third factor, identity. It is hypothesized that higher exposure to conflict
will be associated directly with more psychosocial problems for youth in both populations. It is
also hypothesized that identity achievement will be negatively related to psychosocial problems
for both populations, such that higher identity will be associated with lower levels of
psychosocial problems.
Finally, and most central to the thesis, it is hypothesized that exposure to conflict will
have differing associations with identity for the two populations based on the different
experiences youth in the respective regions had with political conflict. Specifically, for
Palestinian youth, the expectation is that there will be a positive relationship between exposure to
conflict and identity, such that higher exposure is associated with higher identity achievement. In
contrast, the expectation is that for Bosnian youth there will be a negative relationship between
exposure to conflict and identity such that higher exposure will be associated with lower identity
achievement.
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In sum, this thesis examines youth from two distinct conflicts (the first Palestinian
intifada and the war in Bosnia) and posits that, based on the differing experiences these youth
had, there will be opposite effects of their conflict experiences on their identity formation, a key
intervening variable between conflict experience and psychosocial functioning.

Methodology
This study will employ secondary analysis of data collected through the Adolescents and
Political Violence Project (APVP; Barber, 2009b). These data include the Palestinian Young
Adult Survey, administered in Arabic to a representative sample of 900 Palestinian youth living
in Gaza in 1998, and the Bosnian Young Adult Survey, administered in Bosnia to a nonrepresentative sample of 600 Bosnian youth in 2000.
Conflict exposure will be assessed with a multiple-item measure of youth reported
experiences with political conflict (e.g., verbal abuse, being shot at, the killing a family neighbor,
school raids, etc.).Identity was examined using three separate scales created for this thesis project
using combinations of items and/or scales in the surveys: civic identity, religious identity, and
consolidated/social identity. The goal of using these three measures was to highlight the
conceptualization of identity, post-conflict, as a multi-dimensional construct, with emphasis on
collective and social identity that are particularly salient for the populations examined. Finally,
consistent with past research, two measures will be used to assess youth psychosocial
functioning post-conflict: negative self-perception and antisocial behavior. Descriptive, factor,
correlation, and multiple regression, and logistic regression analyses will be used to assess the
study‘s three hypotheses.
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Review of the Literature
Youth Conflict Experience: An Overview
The 2008 UNICEF State of the World‘s Children report indicated that between 1989 and
2000 there were 110 reported conflicts (UNICEF, 2008). Of these, 103 were civil wars. As the
images of conflict have spread across the globe via media coverage, attention has focused
increasingly on individuals experiencing conflict. As this awareness of conflict spreads, research
in this area has intensified. Particularly poignant are images of children caught in the conflict
either as passive observers or active participants. The literature examining political conflict has
become increasingly focused on youth within these conflict zones. The 2005 World Youth
Report defined youth affected by conflict as, ―young people who are in the vicinity of,
perpetrate, are victims of, and/or are otherwise directly affected by any…forms of violence and
their consequences and not just by open warfare‖ (UN World Youth Report, 2005, 151).
Historically, youth have participated regularly in social movements, although within the
scope of the United States much of the emphasis has been placed on college-age youth rather
than adolescents (Barber, 2008a). Within other contexts around the world, non-governmental
organizations have reported high numbers of youth, ages 10 to 20, involved directly in conflict
(UN World Youth Report, 2005). Understandably much of the attention paid to adolescents in
conflict zones has emphasized the violence and abuses suffered by youth subjected to the
atrocities of war. For example, the United Nations has named six areas considered violations
against children occurring in conflict zones: killing or maiming of children, recruitment of
children as soldiers, attacks on schools and hospitals, denial of humanitarian access to children,
abduction of children, and rape and other sexual abuse. These violations have been found to be
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currently occurring in high numbers in 18 countries, primarily in Africa (9 countries) and the
Middle East (4 countries), but also across Asia and South America (www.un.org, retrieved
4/21/08). In addition to these high reports of passive victimization, adolescents‘ engagement in
conflict and actions in support of the conflict is also reported as high in many conflicts (Barber,
2009a).
Examples of political conflict exist across much of the globe. Importantly, adolescents
experiencing conflict are involved in a multitude of ways beyond passive victimhood or
conscribed soldierhood. In many instances, when provided the opportunity adolescents actively
engage in the conflict itself. The differences for participation can be linked to structural
differences in the conflict. War can come upon a population suddenly or be the result of a
progressive building of tension. There may be high participation rates of the youth in one
conflict, or in other conflicts youth may be passive victims of the violence. Youth involvement in
conflict may be minimal, or limited to supportive roles, or they may be active participants in
violent acts. Tension can be spread out over a period of decades or limited to a few years or less.
Factors which have been identified that differentiate youth experience with political conflict
include: the nature of the conflict, proximity to violence, the frequency and duration of exposure,
effects on the immediate family, social and community resources, infrastructure maintenance, as
well as basic needs of access to food, water, shelter and health care (Shaw, 2003).
Proximity to violence has been considered in great detail across studies. For example,
Shamai & Kimhi (2006) found anxiety and life satisfaction differences between groups of Israeli
adolescents based on proximity to Lebanon. Those adolescents who lived along the LebanonIsrael border expressed higher negative symptoms than those who were located more centrally in
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Israel, farther from the border (Shamai & Kimhi, 2006). Populations higher in SES (i.e., with
more resources before the conflict) are likely to experience conflict differently than those with
lower SES who are not as well equipped to deal with the structurally disastrous effects of war
(Angel, Hjern, & Ingleby, 2001). At the individual level, factors which have been shown to
influence both exposure and outcome include: age, gender, cognitive development, temperament,
and previous live events (Angel et al., 2001).
Other factors that may directly or indirectly influence the experience of conflict for youth
are status as a refugee, traumatic loss of a family member or friend, parental absence or presence,
and whether or not they are ―pupils of war,‖ highly involved in the conflict and making a
concerted effort to understand possible roles for themselves in the fighting (Shaw, 2003).
Conflicts which take place within national boundaries produce more civilian victims, and often
take place in close proximity to civilian communities (Angel, et al., 2001).
Two recent conflicts that illustrate well how differently war can be experienced by youth
are the Bosnian war (1992-1996) and the first Palestinian intifada (1987-1993). They differed
markedly in terms of the conflict experience of youth. By examining these two divergent
perspectives, a more complete picture of the influence of identity can be developed.

The Bosnian Conflict Experience
Historically, Bosnia-Herzegovina was a separate province, but in 1878 it was occupied
and later (1908) annexed by Austro-Hungary. Following the Second World War BosniaHerzegovina was included in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (http://www.bosnia.org.uk, retrieved
5/14/08). The region recognized as Bosnia has a long history of integration, reaching back to the
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age of Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman control. In more recent times, three predominant people
exist within Bosnia-Herzegovina: Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats
(Vulliamy, 1994). These people have lived together and some have intermarried (in 1992 more
than 1 in 4 marriages were ethnically mixed), though urban areas were more integrated than rural
areas (Vulliamy, 1994).
As Yugoslavia dissolved in the 1980s, national tensions across the region were
heightened (Bieber, 2000). Outright nationalistic violent conflict emerged in the region following
the declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 (Vulliamy, 1994). BosniaHerzegovina remained part of Yugoslavia until the population voted for independence on April
6th, 1992, though this vote was boycotted by Bosnian Serbs (Congressional Digest, 1996;
Vulliamy, 1994; http://usatoday.com, retrieved 5/14/08). Upon declaration of independence both
Serbia and Croatia responded by invading Bosnia-Herzegovina each with the goal of creating an
―ethnically pure‖ society for their own group (Congressional Digest, 1996;
http://www.bosnia.org.uk, retrieved 5/14/08). While Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats were
claimed by outside groups, Bosnian Muslims, who lived largely secularly, were left without a
group to belong to (Vulliamy, 1994). By August 1992, 1.8 million Bosnians had been affected by
the violence; being driven out of their homes, killed or reported missing (Vulliamy, 1994). As
violence intensified, the United Nations and the United States became involved. The UN
declared safe zones for Bosnians and declared a no-fly zone over the country. NATO was
enlisted to enforce these declarations (Congressional Digest, 1996). In March of 1994 the US
mediated the creation of a federation between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. Serbia
continued to attack despite UN warnings of NATO forceful reactions and from April 1994
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through the summer of 1995 violence continued in the region between Serbian troops and NATO
allies (Congressional Digest, 1996). Following a month-long bombing campaign against Serbian
troops, the US presented a peace initiative to NATO and Russia (Congressional Digest, 1996).
Peace resolutions were brokered by the United States in November of 1995. These resolutions,
the Dayton Accords, brought an end to open conflict, but the country was left broken and divided
(Bieber, 2000; Congressional Digest, 1996; https://www.bosnia.org, retrieved 5/14/08). Over the
course of three years of fighting over 200,000 Bosnians were killed and over 800,000 became
refugees in their own land, with hundreds of thousands of others having fled the country to
surrounding neutral territories (http://usatoday.com, retrieved 5/14/08).
In Bosnia, war arose suddenly and unexpectedly. Prior to the conflict, Bosnian youth
were living in a predominantly secular, integrated society. Yet, the conflict brought persecution
based on religious affiliation. In interviews, Bosnian youth revealed that the war had little
meaning for them, except that the predominantly Muslim youth learned for the first time that
they, as Muslims, differed from their non-Muslim peers. They expressed surprise over the
sudden onset of the war. They also expressed distress over not knowing who the enemy was or
why they were targeted. In these interviews youth described their experience as one in which
―Everything had been turned upside down,‖ and expressed a ―terrible fear to die…even though
[they] didn‘t know who was the enemy at that time or who [they] are fighting against‖ (Barber
2009b, 288). Bosnian youths were forced to process a very confusing situation with little or no
information of the history of conflict between factions in their region. Thus, they were passive,
confused observers of the conflict that steadily grew around them. Studies have continually
found that Bosnian youth – likely in part for these reasons of confusion – have suffered
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significant psychosocial injury from their war exposure (Husain, Allwood, and Bell, 2008;
Miller, Weine, Ramic, Brkic, Bjedic, Smajkic, Boskailo, & Worthington, 2002; Papageorgiou,
Frangou-Garunovic, Iordanidou, Yule, Smith, & Vostanis, 2002; Rosner, Powell, & Butollo,
2003) ).

The Palestinian Conflict Experience
In contrast to the Bosnian conflict which arose suddenly, the Palestinian society has had a
long drawn out history of conflict. The territory commonly referred to as Palestine was
predominantly Muslim Arab when Jews from Russian and Eastern Europe began immigrating to
the area that was ‗holy‘ to them, as it was to other religions. The first wave of immigrants came
between the late 1800s to around 1900. They were mostly inspired to move for religious reasons
and they settled predominantly in cities close to religious sites (e.g., Jerusalem). However, in the
late 1800s the Zionism movement arose as Jewish people attempted to identify themselves as a
nation. Zionists believed in right to the land occupied by those identifying themselves as
Palestinians, and desired to create a state under a singular faith in the same region that they
believed to be the birthplace of Judaism. The second wave of immigrants to the region, between
1900 and 1914, came mostly under the banner of Zionism, with a strong vision of Jewish society
(Smith, 2001). Little opposition was expressed to the first wave of immigrants, but as awareness
of the goals of Zionism grew amongst Arabs, opposition to Jewish immigration and tensions
between Jews and Arabs increased (Smith, 2001; Benin & Hajjar, retrieved 5/14/08).
Upon the onset of WWI in 1914, the land was seen as a potential buffer for Western
Europe from Eastern Europe and Russia. Great Britain regulated the region identified as
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Palestine at this time beginning in 1916 (Frank, 2005; Smith, 2001). In November 1917, in an
effort to quell rising conflict between Arabs and Zionists, the Balfour Declaration was
announced by Great Britain, promising Jewish people a national home on Palestinian land
(Smith, 2001). This agreement was largely rejected by both groups and was followed by the
Cairo conference in March of 1921 which awarded eastern Palestine to the Arabs and western
Palestine to the Jews. Again, neither side was satisfied and intermittent violence continued in the
region (Smith, 2001). Between 1933 and 1935, there was a sudden influx of mostly Polish,
Jewish immigrants who were mostly middle class and settled in cities. The Arab Palestinians
revolted in 1936, initially boycotting, though violence escalated. Britain suppressed the Arab
revolt which lasted from 1936 until 1939 with the Peel commission, which gave 20% of land to
the Jews. When this agreement was also rejected, the British issued the 1939 White Paper
creating a Jewish nation within an independent Palestine (Frank, 2005; Smith, 2001)
During WWII while attentions of Britain were largely elsewhere, Arab nationalism began
to crystallize amongst Palestinians in direct opposition to Jewish nationalism (Smith, 2001). In
1946 when Britain returned its attention to the region, the population ratio was 2:1 favoring
Palestinian Arabs, and Arabs were not willing to consider partitioning (Frank, 2005; Smith,
2001). Following WWII Britain turned over oversight of the region to the United Nations. On
November 29th, 1947, the UN partitioned the region into Arab and Jewish states, but gave the
Jewish state more territory, despite a higher Arab population in the region. Open conflict began
days after the partition (Frank, 2005; Smith, 2001). This fighting was resolved with an armistice
in 1949, resulting in the establishment of State of Israel which consisted of 77% of the original
territory. There was no identified Palestinian/Arab state, effectively creating 700,000 Palestinian
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refugees (Benin & Hajjar, retrieved 5/14/08; Frank, 2005), most of whom went to the Gaza Strip
(controlled by Egypt) and the West Bank (controlled by Jordan).
Throughout the late 1950s and into the early 1960s Palestinians struggled to organize
themselves with al-Fatah and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) emerging as
dominate organizations. Violence escalated through 1960s and intensified greatly beginning in
1967 leading up to the eruption of the Six-Day War on June 5th, 1967 (Frank, 2005; Smith,
2001). In 6 days of fighting, Israel captured the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and declared them
occupied territories (Frank, 2005; Smith, 2001). This war created an additional more than
100,000 Palestinian refugees (Smith, 2001). Life in these territories was difficult for
Palestinians. They were denied political rights and civil liberties and subjected to curfews,
destruction and demolition of their homes, and closing of schools and community institutions
(Benin & Hajjar, retrieved 5/14/08). A Palestinian national movement surfaced under the PLO
seeking a Palestinian/Arab state on the land they originally occupied. Despite continued turmoil
in the region and outside countries attempting diplomatic assistance in creating a
Palestinian/Arab state, it never matriculated. A period of reduction of rights of Palestinians
ensued from the end of the Six-Day war through the early 1980s (Smith, 2001).
In December 1987, following decades of oppression, a spontaneous popular movement of
the Palestinian Arabs against the State of Israel arose (Frank, 2005). This mobilization was
identified as the Intifada (Arabic for ―uprising‖ or ―shaking off;‖ later referred to as the first
Intifada once a second uprising began in 2000). Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian people
were involved in direct conflict, including women, children and large numbers of teenagers.
Initially much of the resistance was acts of civil disobedience. Palestinians organized
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demonstrations, strikes and boycotts (Smith, 2001). They did not pay taxes, and wrote slogans of
opposition on building walls. Eventually conflict intensified to greater violence. Israeli troops
and Palestinians confronted each other with increasing force (Smith, 2001). Between 1987 and
1991 over 1,000 Palestinians were killed, more than 200 of who were under the age of 16 (Benin
& Hajjar, retrieved 5/14/08; Smith, 2001). From October 1991 until the summer of 1993, outside
parties, including the US, attempted to quell the violence with talks in Madrid, but they were
unsuccessful (Frank, 2005; Smith, 2001). The Intifada was officially ended when talks between
the PLO and Israel resulted in the Oslo Declaration of Principles in September 1993 (Frank,
2005; Smith, 2001). The PLO agreed to recognize the right of Israel to ―peace and security‖
while Israel agreed to recognize the PLO as the official representative of the Palestinian people
and conduct future negotiations with them (Smith, 2001).
The 1st intifada deserves investigation because of the uniquely high involvement of
youth. Palestinian youth who experienced the conflict of the 1st intifada grew up living in
sequestered camps in Gaza and the West Bank. They were raised by two generations of people
who instilled in them the desire to fight against the oppression of the occupation. Palestinian
youth were directly and voluntarily involved in active fighting, from the mild, yelling at soldiers,
to the bold, throwing Molotov cocktails. Eighty-five percent (85%) of Palestinian youth reported
that they participated in at least the mild forms of active involvement in the conflict (Barber,
2008). A variety of reasons led to high youth involvement in the first Intifada. Youth saw the
conflict as a natural progression from the oppressive conditions they had been living under, and
actively sought out opportunities for participation. Some were recruited by extremist groups
prior to and during the violence. In addition, violence directed towards their schools left them out
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of school for long periods, and isolation from other areas of Israel left them with few
employment opportunities to occupy their time (Barber, 2008). Interviews with Palestinian
youth reveal their endorsement of the conflict. For example, one youth expressed a sentiment
articulated by many that the conflict ―was for the good for all of the people; to save all the
people. We were together‖ (Barber, 2009b, 295). Unlike in the Bosnian war, youth were clearly
aware of who the enemy was and shared with their society the singular motive of being free from
the Israeli occupation.
Given differences in experience between Bosnian and Palestinian youth (both
predominantly Muslim) these two populations provide an interesting comparison when
considering possible explanations for the effects of political violence on youth.

Effects of Conflict Exposure on Youth’s Psychosocial Functioning
The literature on the effects of trauma exposure on the psychosocial functioning of youth
in conflict environments is predominantly focused on potential negative outcomes. Many studies
reveal high levels of stress, depression, and anxiety in affected children (Saigh, 1985). Barber &
Schluterman (2009) reviewed 95 studies that had quantitatively assessed the impact of political
violence on adolescents in conflicts across the globe. Of the 95 studies reviewed, 96% employed
a negative outcome measure as the primary dependent variable. Most often these negative
outcomes were measured via psychological functioning (95%) with a heavy emphasis on stress
and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Depression and anxiety were also examined. A
minority of the studies looked at indices of negative behavioral functioning (14%), all but two
also including assessments of negative psychological functioning. Negative behavioral
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expressions included aggression, antisocial behavior, delinquency and risk taking. Of the 91
studies that included a measure of negative functioning, 88% found a significant relationship
between exposure to violence and higher levels of negative outcomes, confirming the prevailing
opinion that youth exposed to conflict will experience negative consequences, be they
psychological or behavioral (Barber & Schluterman, 2009).
Among Bosnian youth, high rates of post traumatic stress symptoms have been found. .
In a study of 791 Sarajevan children (of which 86% were Bosnian Muslim), Husain, et al. (2008)
found 41% of this population was experiencing clinically significant symptoms of PTSD, with
18% in the moderate to severe range. In another study of 95 8-13 year old Bosnian refugees,
47% were within the clinical range for depression (Papageorgiou, et al., 2002). Angel et al.
(2001), in a study of Bosnian refugees, found that 36% of adolescents reported hyper-vigilance
and 40% reported being more nervous or sad. In one study, Bosnians were found to experience,
on average 24 traumatic events over the course of the war (Rosner, et al., 2003). That study
revealed no significant difference between men and women in events experienced, but women
manifested significantly higher PTSD following exposure than men (Rosner et al., 2003). In
sum, studies investigating the prevalence of negative outcomes in Bosnian youth exposed to war
have regularly found high rates of stress and other problems.
For studies that have assessed the correlation between violence exposure and outcomes in
youth in Bosnia, findings are very consistent in documenting that exposure to conflict is
predictive of lower psychosocial functioning in Bosnian adolescents. For example, Miller et al.
(2002) examined a community group and a clinical group, and found that violence exposure in
war was associated with PTSD symptoms for both groups. For the non-clinical community
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sample, the effects of refugee status, such as social isolation, were also associated with PTSD
symptoms as well as depression (Miller et al., 2002). Durakovic-Belko, Kulenovic, & Dapic
(2003) found traumatic loss, an indicator of exposure, was the strongest predictor of PTSD in a
student population in Bosnia. This same study also confirmed earlier studies indicating more
intensive war trauma experiences were associated with higher PTSD and depression (DurakovicBelko et al., 2003). Using the data to be analyzed in the present study, McCouch (2009) found
neighborhood violence was associated with higher ‗criminality‘ a measure of antisocial behavior.
Studies have also revealed high levels of depression among some samples of Palestinian
youth. For example, in a study of 229 Palestinian adolescents living in Gaza, Elbedour,
Onwuegbuzie, Ghannam, Whitcome, & Hein, 2007 found that 40% of the youth were in the
moderate to severe range on a depression index. Qouta, Punamaki, & El Sarraj (2003) in a study
of 121 Palestinians ages 6-16, found 54% of children suffering severe PTSD, and another 33.5%
experiencing moderate PTSD. The link between exposure to violence and negative psychosocial
outcomes has been revealed in research focused on this population as well. Punamaki, Qouta, &
El-Sarraj (2001) found high levels of PTSD in children exposed to high levels of trauma, and this
effect was exaggerated in children who passively experienced the trauma rather than actively
engaged in the conflict. A study of Palestinians aged 11 and 12 found that more exposure to war
trauma was associated with more concentration, memory and attention problems, higher
neuroticism and higher risk taking; all considered negative outcome effects (Qouta, Punamaki, &
El-Sarraj, 1995). Thabet, Abed, & Vostanis (2004) in a study of 400 Palestinian youth (ages 9 to
15) in refugee camps found that stress and emotional difficulties were both independently
predicted by experience of traumatic events.
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Most of the psychosocial problems examined in these studies included internal
manifestations, but Garbarino & Kostelny (1996) found that exposure to violence also lead to
more risk factors for external behavioral problems. The number of risk factors was associated
with the number of behavioral problems expressed by Palestinian youth, such that more risk
factors lead to higher expression of behavioral problems (Garbarino & Kostelny, 1996). Barber
(1999, 2001) found that higher levels of both depression and antisocial behavior amongst
Palestinian youth post-conflict were associated with higher experience with the Intifada using a
measure that aggregated both activism and victimization. When this measure was disaggregated,
as in Barber (2009b), it was found that victimization was still associated with negative
psychosocial outcomes, though activism was not. Clearly, like for Bosnian youth, it is generally
agreed that exposure to violence is associated with increased negative functioning of Palestinian
youth.
Therefore, in the present study, it is hypothesized that violence exposure will be
associated positively with negative psychosocial functioning (i.e., negative self-perception,
higher antisocial behavior) for both Bosnian and Palestinian youth. Figure 2.1 illustrates these
hypothesized pathways.

Exposure to
Conflict

Palestinian (+)

Bosnian (+)
Figure 2.1 Expected Association between Exposure and Outcome

Negative
Outcomes
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Identity
As noted earlier, this study focuses on identity as a potential mechanism for
understanding the effect of political conflict on youth functioning. Identity as a field of study has
gained attention in recent years, especially in international research which compares the process
of identity formation as it occurs for youth in varying socio-cultural environments. Erikson
(1988) described identity formation in terms of a universal process which takes place during
adolescence, and is the result of a drive towards forming a coherent sense of self. Erikson wrote:
―the creation of a sense of sameness, a unity of personality now felt by the individual and
recognized by others as having consistency in time- of being, as it were, an irreversibly historical
fact,‖ inspired by, ―young lives in the search of something and somebody to be true to,‖
(Erikson, 1988, 3). Much of Erikson‘s work has subsequently been criticized for trying to paint
the process of identity formation with too broad of a stroke to be applicable cross-culturally, but
the basic principle of discovering a self via internal and external factors that provide stability for
the individual is a continuously reinforced principle in identity literature (Nsamenang, 1999;
Schwartz, Cote, & Arnett, 2005).
Historically, identity consolidation had four possible statuses, one desirable and the
others thought to be associated with negative psychological functioning. Identity moratorium
occurs when an individual experiences crisis and exploration, without committing to a
consolidated identity (Meilman, 1979). Moratorium is considered vital to the formation of a
coherent identity. Erikson wrote, ―youth must test extremes before setting on a considered
course‖ (Erikson, 1988, 3). Adolescents in moratorium are in the midst of their identity crisis.
Their commitments are vague and they exhibit needs for both guidance and rebellion (Marcia,
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1966; Orlofsky, Marcia, & Lesser, 1973). Following this period of exploration, a commitment to
some identity is expected. An individual who has reached identity achievement has committed to
an identity through a rigorous process of questioning and exploring his or her beliefs. This is
considered the most successful result of identity exploration. Individuals who have reached
identity achievement have a strong commitment to their ideological and occupational choices.
They are stable and able to set and pursue reasonable goals. Identity achieved individuals have
an internally, as opposed to externally, based self concept (Marcia, 1966; Orlofsky et al., 1973).
Less ideal outcomes include foreclosure and diffusion. Identity foreclosure occurs when
an individual commits to a sense of self without exploration. Usually the individual is
committing to parental values. The foreclosed individual has not experienced a crisis state and
experiences great discomfort if the environment around her or him shifts unexpectedly.
Foreclosed youths have committed to an ideology, but not achieved it of their own accord
(Marcia, 1966; Orlofsky et al., 1973). Finally, diffusion occurs when and individual exists in an
uncommitted state, without focused exploration and notably without commitment (Marcia, 1966;
McLean & Pratt, 2006; Meilman, 1979; Orlofsky et al., 1973). The four main identity statuses
are the focus of much identity research and have been the predominant accepted classifications
for the last four decades.
There are some generally accepted purposes and factors related to identity formation
under a variety of circumstances which may be weighted differently in the context of unique
political conflicts. Foremost of these is that identity is a system, not a static state. This means that
as the daily needs and demands upon the individual change, so does self-perception, at least for
an individual who grows up in an environment where s/he is challenged to seek out a healthy
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identity (Ethier & Deaux, 1994; Vignoles et al., 2006; Yi & Shorter-Gooden, 1999). The self is a
story, and evolves across time and context driven by varying motivations and shaped by
exposure (McLean & Pratt, 2006). This is particularly important to keep in mind when
considering youth in conflict environments who may have experienced one or more distinct
transitions in their social context.
There are several factors which drive an individual to seek out a healthy consolidated
identity. When that identity is achieved, it is expected that those motivations will also be
fulfilled, and the individual will be better equipped to handle fluctuations in environment,
notably those extreme variations that may arise in contexts of conflict. The primary purpose of
identity formation, as described by Erikson and elaborated by others is the development and
maintenance of self-esteem given continuity across time and situation (Erikson, 1988; Vignoles,
Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006). Creating a continuous sense of self in a fluctuating
environment is a major challenge facing adolescents. To reinforce continuity an individual may
seek a stable membership in a group. Belongingness is important to the construction of a
coherent identity as the individual must develop closeness to other people as well as an
acceptance by others within an established group (Vignoles et al., 2006). In addition to
belongingness, though it may seem a contradiction, creation of a sense of uniqueness is a
motivating factor for identity formation. An individual is driven towards consolidated identity
partially as a means to be differentiated from others (Vignoles et al., 2006). Finally, individuals
are driven to make meaning of their lives and to find significance and purpose in them. In
addition, the individual is motivated by the need to develop a sense of efficacy so that he or she
can act on that achieved meaning in purpose. These motivations are important to the
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development of a general psychological consolidation of identity formation and lead to the
conceptualization of positive identity formation as a protective factor for youth (Vignoles et al.,
2006).

The Impact of Identity on Youth Psychosocial Functioning
Erikson (1988) and Marcia (1966) have emphasized the importance of achieving a
consolidated identity as primary to a healthy ability to navigate daily life. For example, Marcia
(1966) explored the four identity statuses and found that identity achieved individuals displayed
the highest ego-identity, performed better on a concept-attainment task even in stressful
situations, maintained a realistic level of aspiration, were less willing to submit to authoritarian
figures, and their self-esteem was less variable.
In addition to this broader conceptualization of achieved versus foreclosed or diffused
identity, considering the motives for identity formation is relevant specifically to youth
experiences with political conflict. With respect to self-esteem, for example, developing a
positive self-image and enhancing that image could be particularly challenging for youth facing
oppression and aggression based on factors that are historically ingrained or immutable, such as
religion or ethnicity. It may be more important for these youths to develop a positive sense of
their in-group rather than one of themselves (Barber, 2009b). This speaks to the emphasis placed
on belongingness versus uniqueness across different environments.
Belongingness is often an externally influenced factor, extending from the proximity to
and contact with a particular group. For youth experiencing political conflict, group membership
may be forced into salience, as it was for the Bosnians, or it may be well-established prior to the
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outbreak of violence as it was for Palestinians. In addition to a drive for belongingness and
acceptance, youth are expected to seek out a sense of uniqueness through identity development,
a level of distinctiveness which separates them from their peers (Vignoles et al., 2006).
However, for adolescents experiencing political conflict, this may not be of prime import. There
is not the same process of exploration available to youth experiencing the dangers of a conflict
situation and hence the need for a salient group identity as a protective factor may override the
individual need for establishing uniqueness (Barber, 2009b).
Clearly, motivation for the formation of identity is influenced highly by context, as well
as playing an important role in the successful development of adolescents in conflict zones.
Youth who successfully navigate traumatic experiences show an intact sense of purpose and
drive in their lives, speaking to the importance of self-esteem, one of the main motives for
identity construction (Kline & Mone, 2003). These youth have protection against destructive
social isolation, which indicates a positive development of belongingness within their in-group
community (Kline & Mone, 2003).
Despite of all of the differences highlighted between the two youth populations under
study here, both consist of adolescents who have an internal, innate drive towards a
consolidated, healthy identity, which, for all youth, is expected to predict positive (or less
negative) outcomes (Erikson, 1988; Marcia, 1966). Therefore, the second hypothesis of this
study is that identity achievement or consolidation will be associated with better psychological
outcomes for both Bosnian and Palestinian youths. This suggested path is diagrammed in
Figure 2.2.
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Identity
Formation

Palestinian (-)

Negative
Outcomes

Bosnian (-)
Figure 2.2 Expected Association between Identity and Outcome

The Differential Impact of Exposure to Political Violence on Identity Formation
Thus far, hypotheses have been common across groups: 1) conflict exposure will be
positively associated with negative psychoscocial functioning, and 2) identity formation will be
negatively associated with negative psychosocial functioning. However, the third path in the
proposed model – the link between conflict exposure and identity formation - is hypothesized to
be different across the two groups of youth. The differential impact of conflict exposure on
identity formation is the central proposed contribution of this study. Specifically, it is proposed
that exposure to political violence will be related negatively with identity achievement for
Bosnian youth (i.e., the higher the exposure to conflict, the lower the degree of identity
achievement), but that for Palestinian youth, exposure to political conflict will be related
positively to identity achievement (i.e., the higher the exposure, the higher the identity).
This review now proceeds to justify this differential impact based on the differences in
the two conflicts, several elements of which have impact on youth identity formation,
particularly when the social, group, and ethnic elements of identity are part of the
conceptualization of identity as is the case in this study. The conflicts in Bosnia and Palestine
were fundamentally different. Prior to the conflict, Palestinian youth grew up in a segregated
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community, many of them in refugee camps, based solely on their ethnic and religious
affiliation. Bosnian youth grew up in a highly integrated society moving decidedly toward
independence from Yugoslavia. When conflict arose, Palestinian youth were well-prepared for
its start. Within their homes and communities Palestinian youth gained an understanding of what
the conflict meant, and what active roles they should take in it. Bosnian youth were caught by
surprise when enemy forces invaded their country, unaware that there was even an enemy to
fear. Bosnian youths watched their older family and neighbors leave to fight an unidentified
aggressor, while they sat passively watching the conflict unfold without opportunity to engage.
Even the types of violence Palestinians and Bosnians were exposed to were varied. Palestinians
were subjected to direct campaigns against their homes, and violence targeted against individuals
in an effort to humiliate. Bosnian youth experienced violence in a seemingly more random
manner as attacks often came from unseen snipers, or located at a distance, launching long-range
attacks and demolishing neighborhoods. They were shot at and experienced deaths of neighbors
and family members in higher numbers than Palestinian youth, but they had less contact with
their ‗enemies‘ than Palestinians (see Barber 2008 for an elaboration of these and other
differences).
In addition to these structural distinctions between the two conflicts, a prime difference is
the meaning that the two populations attributed to the conflict (Barber, 2009b; Markus &
Kitayama, 1991). Difference in meaning exists because of cultural constructions of values and
beliefs contributing to a group‘s sense of identity (Kaufman, 2004). Barber (2009b) asserts that
meaning related to identity encompasses not just the structural consolidation of identity as an
internal process, but also external influences such as historical, political, cultural, and religious
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systems. Bosnian youth struggled to ascribe meaning to the conflict, perceiving the invasions of
their land as unprompted. They were largely unaware of a history of conflict in their region, and
were uninvolved and unaware politically. The wider Bosnian community context was integrated
such that there was little ethnic segregation, much less ethnic solidarity spurred by segregation,
and they were a relatively secular Muslim society. Bosnian Muslim youth do not link conflict to
a historically predictable step, nor to a larger understanding of a defense of their culture. When
Bosnians described their conflict experience, although emotional, it was often ―sterile,‖ lacked
detail, and revealed the youth‘s ―preoccupation with trauma‖ (Barber, 2009b; 288-289). For
example, one Bosnian youth stated, ―we were silent observers; we witnessed genocide, ethnic
cleansing, human behavior at its worst,‖ implying that youth were not engaged in the conflict
itself (Barber, 2009b; 293). The conflict did not give these youth a sense of purpose or direction,
instead it left them, ―frightened, embittered, and traumatized‖ (Barber, 2009b; 302). For Bosnian
youth, conflict left them more scattered and confused about their identity, particularly their
identity related to external influences.
Palestinians, on the other hand, were able to apply significant meaning to the violence,
one of asserting their culture while striving towards a goal for their people. The Palestinian
youth who experienced the first Intifada was a population that grew up completely within the
literal confines of their religious and political community and within large and cohesive families,
all factors which contribute to the powerful sense of identity Palestinian have or seek (Khalidi,
1997). They came of age understanding the conflict and their role in it as Palestinians—from a
combination of historical, political, and religious standpoints. When Palestinian youth were
interviewed about their experience, responses included very detailed explanations of the reasons
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behind the conflict and reports of repeated expressions of support, both psychological and
behavioral. For example, one Palestinian youth stated, ―of course everybody participated in
doing anything against the occupation… [it was] something for Palestine‖ (Barber, 2009b, 295).
While Bosnian youth were left broken by conflict, Palestinian youths‘ sense of self was
reinforced by the experience of conflict.
These meaning-making differences suggest identity formation may be further explored as
influential to psychosocial functioning for these two groups. Classic identity formation, as
described by Erikson, dictates an innate, stalwart path, from identity diffusion to identity
consolidation, through a period of internal searching, experienced during adolescence (Erikson,
1988). However, there are a variety of external factors which also influence identity construction,
and must be considered. Schachter (2004, 193) wrote that identity formation should be,
―understood in terms of the implicit objectives of the individual in constructing his or her
identity.‖ For Palestinian and Bosnian youth who have experienced conflict, the creation of a
consolidated identity may be motivated more strongly by external factors, particularly social,
collective and ethnic factors. It is these factors that distinguish the Bosnian from the Palestinian
experience.

External Influences of Identity Formation
Sources which influence how a sense of self is conceptualized are as unique as the
motives that drive identity consolidation. Parents, peers, and communities, especially school, all
have great impact over the ways that youth see themselves fitting in with larger society. When
considering identity as a ―subjective concept of oneself as a person‖ (Vignoles, et al., 2006) it is
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understood that there are certain external factors that influence identity formation. Societies are
highly varied, even those in peace time. As previously indicated in this chapter wartime societies
cannot be lumped together in one ―context of conflict,‖ because of the nuances of every conflict,
from the onset, to the involvement of individuals, to reconciliation (or lack thereof). Given that
war is so different, it may indeed impact identity formation in different ways.
Adolescents rely on internal, self-appraisal and external appraisal of the group they
belong to for self-esteem construction (Brown & Lohr, 1987). Maintaining and enhancing
positive self-esteem is one of the key motivators for identity development. Adolescents in
persecuted groups in the midst of conflict situations may be challenged by negative external
perceptions of their in-group. Ethier & Deaux (1994) found that when youth come into a stressful
situation which challenges their cultural identity, those who have a strong conception of their
cultural identity initially are more likely to take steps to strengthen that identity and the end
result is a strengthened overall sense of identity, as well as self-esteem. In contrast, youth who
encounter a stressful situation with a weak sense of cultural identity are more likely to
experience higher stress and lower self-esteem as well as to not strengthen their cultural identity
(Ethier & Deaux, 1994). This theory supports the idea that conflict exposure may strengthen
Palestinian‘s identity, while impeding identity formation in Bosnians.
Culture—particularly ethnicity related to religiosity and political affiliation—becomes
central to the in-group vs. out-group comparisons under which youth in conflict create much of
their identity. Parents inform children of their cultural heritage and often instill perceptions of the
in-group and out-group (Hughes, Rodriguez, Smith, Johnson, Stevenson, & Spicer, 2006). For
youth in contexts of conflict group identity may take precedence over individual identity. It then
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becomes increasingly important to clearly define the group. A group can be defined by the
responsibilities group membership demands—loyalty and active participation in the group be
they conflict related (e.g. protesting, fighting, political awareness, etc.), or not (e.g. religious
observance, community assistance through teaching, volunteering, etc.) (Barber, 2009b).
Beyond the specific differences in conflict experiences, and identity motives discussed
above, several classic theoretical domains of identity theory can also be invoked to defend the
expectation of the differential impact on identity of exposure to political violence.

Social & Group Identity
Group membership is vital to a sense of belongingness, an important aspect in the
development of positive self-esteem (Tajfel, 1982). As stated earlier in this chapter, a major goal
of identity formation is the development of positive self-esteem and establishment of a sense of
belongingness (Vignoles et al., 2006). Adolescents are a unique population to study because of
their developmental reliance on social community in addition to an in-process construction of a
sense of self (Barber, 2008; Brown & Lohr, 1987). These commonalities tie group identity to
individual identity.
Tajfel (1981, 15) defines social identity as, ―that part of the individual‘s self-concept that
derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the
value and emotional significance of that membership.‖ Positive social identity is achieved
through comparison with out-groups, meaning that conceptions of one‘s social group are
relational and situational.
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While the categorization of group membership may be perceived as stable, the level of
emphasis placed on group membership may vary as needed across situation. Palestinian youth
place much emphasis on their group membership as part of their ―self‖ in addition to its role in
involvement in conflict. Bosnian youth did not have a salient group pertaining to their status as
Muslims before the conflict began, and therefore may have struggled to see group membership
as an important part of their identity and/or meaning behind the aggression. This further
illustrates the idea that conflict solidifies identity for Palestinians while it deters identity
formation for Bosnians.
Tajfel‘s Social Identity Theory (SIT) states; if and when group membership increases in
salience, there is a significant increase in in-group favoritism, stemming largely from
competition between groups (Tajfel, 1982). This applies directly to groups in conflict. The need
for, and expression of, social identity is not static, but instead continually evolving as the
individual attempts to maintain a stable, positive self-concept (Ethier & Deaux, 1994). As ingroups go on the affront in the name of their group (as in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict), the
salience of group membership would increase, tightening the group around some central ingroup point. Often this central point is some configuration of ethnicity (Tajfel, 1982). The highly
integrated nature of Bosnian society was not conducive to the creation of specific in- and outgroups. In sum, social identity theory supports the overarching hypothesis that conflict exposure
will lead to more positive identity formation for Palestinian youth and negative identity
formation for Bosnian youth.
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Collective Identity
While SIT is applicable to the Palestinian and Bosnian groups of this study, Tajfel‘s
Social Identity Theory has been criticized by some as being ambiguous given the innate
variability in group formation, and the intricacies associated with social context (Ashmore,
Deaux, Mclaughlin-Volpe, 2004). Because of this, more specific theories of collective identity
have been developed to explain the process of group identification and solidarity (Ashmore et al.,
2004).
Collective identity is an extension of social identity. Some theorists suggest that having a
distinct identity titled ―social‖ implies that other forms of identity, such as individual or
occupational, do not have social elements (Ashmore et al., 2004; Brubaker & Cooper, 2000;
Saunders, 2008; Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Also, collective identity was defined to separate
itself from Tajfel‘s SIT, of which competition is a large part of creating an in-group/out-group
dynamic (Ashmore et al., 2004). Brubaker & Cooper (2000, 19) define collective identity as an
―emotionally laden sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded group, involving both a felt
solidarity or oneness with fellow group members and a felt difference from or antipathy to
specified outsiders.‖ Collective identity is assumed by members of a group usually based on
some characteristic, blatant (such as ethnicity or gender) or abstract (such as religious affiliation
or political beliefs) (Ashmore et al., 2004).
Although collective identities are primarily psychological and not sociological concepts,
they do develop within social contexts (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). One individual may have
many collective identities based on religious affiliation, political beliefs, gender, ethnicity,
education level, occupational status, etc. (Coleman & Lowe, 2007; Simon & Klandermans,
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2001). Still, the main goals are the same, to create a sense of belongingness and stability for the
individual (Coleman & Lowe, 2007). The formation of a collective identity also generates a
sense of self-respect and respect for other in-group members, builds meaning based on the
characteristic and its reception by the environment, and creates a sense of agency within the
individual pertaining to their role in the social realm (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).
Ashmore et al. (2004) identified several major elements common to all collective
identities. Firstly, individuals fundamentally categorize themselves into some group. All other
elements of collective identity follow from this assumption. Individuals are evaluative of the
unifying characteristic from their own and outsiders‘ perspectives but the importance of those
characteristics are variable (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). The importance of collective identity is
both implicit and explicit. Explicit importance is the value an individual places on the
categorization from the collective identity in his or her daily life. Implicit importance is the level
of accessibility or salience of a categorization in the individual‘s context. Linked with this
concept of implicit importance is the concept of social embeddedness, which is the external
experience of the individual due to some associated collective identity (Ashmore et al., 2004).
Regarding the youth population under study here, the identity of Palestinian youth may
be characterized by explicit importance, implicit importance and social embeddedness. The
identity of Bosnian youth would be less reflective of these factors, given the segregated vs.
integrated nature of these societies.
Attachment and interdependence are perhaps the most recognizable characteristics of
collective identity. Attachment indicates an ―affective commitment‖ to the group while
interdependence indicates some recognized ―mutual fate‖ (Ashmore et al., 2004). This factor is
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of prime import to groups in conflict. Individuals who feel attached to their in-group may be
more likely to become directly involved in their support, even if this means direct contact with
violence. In addition, having some recognized mutual fate can be translated into a mutual end
goal for populations in conflict, be it independence or simply self defense.
An individual also takes outward behavioral actions that express his or her collective
identity. This concept includes language and religious observance, but is often influenced by
other unrelated factors such as access to places of worship and opportunity for participation
(Ashmore et al., 2004). Palestinian youth had many more opportunities to participate in their
conflict than Bosnian youth did, providing reinforcement for their collective identity (Barber,
2008). The content and meaning of some categorical identities are important such that an
individual attributes the characteristics of that identity to themselves, maintains an ideology
consistent with the grouping, and creates an explanatory narrative that represents the self
(Ashmore et al., 2004). Though conflict is often unpredictable, for Palestinian youth it was
expected, progressed naturally, and well understood, helping them to maintain a consistent
meaning associated with the conflict and their own in-group. The experience of conflict itself
helps to strengthen identity through allowing youths to search for their place in the group. For
Bosnian Muslim youth, the conflict was hazy and the enemy not well-defined, and they appeared
to arrive at their identity ―by default‖ without the opportunity to actively engage in its inception
(Barber, 2009b, 300). Meaning for these youth is not coherent, and the conflict may have served
to confuse their progression toward identity rather than enhance it.
There is very little research that has explicitly tested the role of identity in conflict
environments. One example is Coleman & Lowe‘s (2007) pilot study of Israeli and Palestinian
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adults found that those characteristics most important to adaptation in the face of conflict within
collective identity are cognitive complexity (such that integration of a variety of experiences is
possible), tolerance of contradictions, openness and uncertainty, and emotional resilience in
response to positive and negative revelations about the assumed collective identity. In conflict
environments these characteristics are most often explored in the realm of ethnicity; and its
related religious and political factors.

Ethnicity, Religiosity, Politicization and Identity
While ethnic identity has been defined by scholars as ―fluid, dynamic, [and] constructed
in a relational (interpersonal) context‖ (Yi & Shorter-Gooden, 1999, 16), for adolescents in some
conflicts it may be much more firmly defined. The social construction of ethnicity becomes
particularly evident when observing groups forced out of their homes and often into refugee
camps, as the group assumes an identity (as in the Palestinian conflict) or is labeled with one (as
in the Bosnian conflict) (Avruch, 2001). Cultural leaning and teaching occurs across time, both
across the lifespan and across the broader evolution of the group; as well as within a multitude of
contexts from parental sources to societal ones (i.e. peers, school, community organizations)
(Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, & Maynard, 2003; Howard, 2000).
Even in non-conflict environments ethnic socialization is an important part of
development among in-groups and between parents and children. Hughes et al. (2006) found that
generally ethnic socialization takes two forms; (1) cultural pride, the history and heritage of the
in-group, and (2) ethnic socialization, discrimination, and preparation for bias from the outgroup. As children grow up and develop cognitively, parents generally move from a more
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egalitarian preparation in early childhood toward more complex discussions and more
preparation for bias (Hughes et al., 2006). Also, if parents have a higher attachment to their own
cultural group they are more likely to emphasize a balance between in-group support and the
possibility of out-group bias, and this becomes more pronounced as children grow up. What
parents teach their children is highly reflective of their own experiences (Hughes et al., 2006).
Based on this reasoning Palestinian youth grow up aware of their heritage partially
because prior generations have also experienced segregation. In contrast, Bosnian Muslim
parents may be less likely to teach their children about their in-group or prepare them for
discrimination from out groups because they grew up in an integrated society. Less preparation
may lead to poorer ability to handle conflicts over self-esteem and in-group/out-group
comparisons for Bosnian Muslims, while Palestinians will be better prepared and buffered
against self-esteem threats (Tajfel, 1982).
In addition to parental transmission, ethnic socialization occurs in other social aspects of
a youth‘s environment (Howard, 2000). Ethnic identification has many segments including,
cultural behaviors, evaluation and in-group attitudes, values and beliefs, and commitment to
these values and beliefs (Phinney & Ong, 2007). On a purely conceptual level, identity formation
includes an ―integrated stance on existential issues‖ (Duriez, et al., 2008, 1023). These existential
issues incorporate religiosity. Meilman (1979) found age-related increases in religious crisis
across adolescence (considering males ages 12 to 24) in western cultures. Schachter (2004, 193)
proposed, ―individuals can construct identity in more than one way and…may be guided by a
person‘s particular objective regarding his or her structure of identity, given the complex
context.‖ Taken in the context of conflict, perhaps the individual develops ethnic and religious
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identifications with respect to how they influence political affiliation and investment in their ingroup‘s struggle. Religiosity is particularly salient for strict Muslim cultures such as among
Palestinians. Palestinian identity may be enhanced by a focus on religiosity within the conflict.
For Bosnian Muslim youth who had a less strict construction of religious meaning prior to
experiencing conflict, confusion over religiosity may further impede identity development.
The politicization of religion, in terms of national boundaries and elected leadership
comes to the forefront as youth begin to determine their own beliefs. Erikson (1988, 3) wrote,
―loyal and legal have the same root, linguistically as psychologically, for legal commitment is an
unsafe burden unless shouldered with a sense of sovereign choice and experienced as loyalty.‖
Erikson identifies this as fidelity (Erikson, 1988, 3).
As youths are exposed to beliefs of ethnicity and religion in context they may become
more aligned with the cause of their in-group, as is the case with Palestinian adolescents.
Political affiliation is directly tied to group identity formation for these youth, particularly those
who develop a sense of purpose based on that political affiliation, as in the Palestinian
experience. In contrast, Bosnian youth did not place the same emphasis on ethnic, religious, or
political status in their daily life prior to conflict. Bosnian youth were not able to link these
factors with their persecution. This, again, supports the hypothesis that conflict exposure will be
positively related to identity formation based on ethnic, religious and political factors for
Palestinian youth, and negatively related to identity formation based on these factors for Bosnian
youth.
In sum, theories of social, collective, and ethnic identity formation support the
expectation that, given the unique and varied contexts of the Palestinian and Bosnian conflict,
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Exposure to
Conflict

Palestinian (+)

Identity
Formation

Bosnian (-)
Figure 2.3 Expected Association between Exposure and Identity

differing dynamics relative to identity construction and consolidation would be operative.
Specifically, for Palestinian youths it is expected that conflict exposure would be positively
related to identity formation. In contrast, for Bosnian youths, it is expected that conflict exposure
would be negatively related to identity formation. (See figure 2.3)

Summary & Hypotheses
Much recent research has begun to focus on conflict and its impact on youth living in
these environments but it has not yet adequately investigated explanatory mechanisms that may
underlie that impact. Meanwhile identity theory has moved a long way beyond individual
identity to include social, cultural, and environmental dynamics. The goal of this research is to
investigate the potential influence of identity as an intervening variable in the relationship
between exposure to conflict and negative outcomes, and, most importantly, to test the
expectation that because of youths‘ varied experiences with political conflict, the impact of
conflict on identity will be different.
The proposed model (see figure 2.4 for a summary depiction) contains three pathways
with these corresponding hypotheses:
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1. Conflict exposure will be related positively to psychological problems for both groups.
2. Identity formation will be related negatively to psychological problems for both groups.
3. Conflict exposure will be related positively to identity formation for Palestinian youth
and negatively to identity formation for Bosnian youth. .

Identity
Formation

Pal(-), Bos (-)

Pal (+), Bos (-)
Exposure
to
Conflict

Negative
Outcomes

Pal (+), Bos (+)
Figure 2.4 Overall Model of Hypotheses
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Methods
This study employed secondary analysis of two existing survey data sets: one of
Palestinian youth and a second of Bosnian youth. The data were collected as a part of the
Adolescents and Political Violence Project (APVP; Barber, 2009b). First, surveys were
administered in 1998 to a representative sample of 917 youth in the Gaza Strip, ages 20 to 27.
This age range was chosen to ensure that the youth had lived at least three years of the conflict
during their teen years. The survey was written in English, translated into Arabic, and pilot tested
several times before administration. Two-thirds of the respondents (N=614) were participants in
the 8 United Nations Development Programs in the Gaza Strip. One third of the respondents
(N=303) were students in selected classes at two major universities in the Gaza Strip [Al Azhar
University (N=193) and Islamic University (N=110)]. The sample was representative of sex,
religion, place of residence, and education level, among other personal characteristics.
This same survey – modified slightly to reflect differences in aspects of the conflict - was
translated from English into Bosnian. It was administered to a non-representative sample of 600
Bosnian youth living in Sarajevo in 2002. The Bosnian youth were also of the age that they
would have experienced three or more years of conflict during their teen years. (See table 3.1 for
descriptive statistics on these two samples- Palestinian data excerpted from Barber, 2009b).
The APVP survey was comprised of closed-ended questions about youths‘ lives and
beliefs and experiences throughout the respective conflicts, administered post-conflict. In an
effort to equate the two samples, only data from Muslim respondents among both samples was
considered: 99% percent of the Palestinian sample self-reported as Muslim; 84.9% percent of the
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Bosnian sample self-reported as Muslim. Selecting for Muslim respondents resulted in samples
of 917 Palestinians and 522 Bosnians that were the focus of the analyses.

Exposure to Political Conflict
The independent variable of this study was the level of exposure to violence experienced
by the youth in each conflict. The 19 specific items for exposure were written based on extensive
interviews with Palestinian youths and adults (Barber, 2009b) about their conflict experience.
The same set of items was used also in the Bosnian survey (McCouch, 2009). Questions were
asked in reference to four time periods of each conflict. For the Gaza study, the time periods
were: ―before the Intifada,‖ ―1st 2 Years of the Intifada (1988-1989),‖ ―Last 3 Years of the
Intifada (1990-1993),‖ and ―After the Intifada.‖ For the Bosnian survey, the time periods were
―before the conflict,‖ ―1st 2 Years of the conflict (1992-1994),‖ ―Last 2 Years of the conflict,‖
and ―After the conflict.‖
For each time period and for each of the 19 exposure items, youth responded to the stem,
―In each of the following time periods how often did enemy soldiers do the following.‖ See
Table 3.2 for the full set of items. Response options were: 1 never, 2 once, 3 2-10 times, 4 11-20
times, 5 21-50 times, and 6 more than 50 times. These items have been previously analyzed
separately on both sets of data (Barber & Olsen, 2009; McCouch, 2009). Among these analyses,
efforts were made via both reflective and formative structural equation modeling to use the item
set in a combined data set of Palestinian and Bosnian data (Barber, 2008). However, these efforts
were unsuccessful given the substantially different pattern of responses to the items from the two
groups of youth. Those empirical results lead to the conclusion that it was not feasible to use
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Table 3.1 Characteristics of Palestinian and Bosnian Populations
Range

Average

20-27

22.3

Palestinians
Age (Years)
Family Size
Brothers
Sisters

4.3
3.4

Sex
Male

59%

Marital Status
Single

82%

Religious Affiliation
Muslim

99%

Geographic Distribution
Gaza Strip North
Gaza Strip Central
Gaza Strip South

16%
47%
36%

Residence
Camp
Village
City/Town

55%
9%
36%

Standard of living
―Poorer than Most‖
―Richer than Most‖
Father employed 1997

17%
13%
32%

Educational Attainment
Finished secondary school
Finished university
Currently enrolled in
University

98%
20%
61%

Employment
―Employed never in 1997‖
―Employed often in 1997‖

48%
33%

Political Affiliation
No political affiliation
Fatah
Hamas
PFLP
Islamic Jihad
Other

41%
33%
13%
7%
2%
4%

45
Table 3.1 Continued
Range

Average

19-30

23.52

Bosnians
Age (Years)
Family Size
Brothers
Sisters

.75
.79

Sex
Male

66%

Marital Status
Single

92.1%

Religious Affiliation
Muslim

84.9%

Geographical Distribution
Unsko-Sansk Kanton
Posavski Kanton
Tuzlanski Kanton
Zenicko-Dobojski
Bosansko-Podrinjski
Srendnjo-Bosanski
Hercegovacko-Neret
Zapadno-Hercegovacki
Kanton Sarajevo
Hercegovacko-Bosanski
Distrikt-Brcko
Republika Srpska

4.5%
0.8%
5.8%
10.2%
2.0%
5.1%
2.3%
0.5%
64.8%
0.7%
0.2%
3.1%

Residence
Village
City/Town

12.2%
87.8%

Standard of living
―Poorer than Most‖
―Richer than Most‖
Father employed 1997
(very often)

15.4%
11.5%
59.8%

Educational Attainment
Finished secondary school
Finished university
Currently enrolled in
University

3.2%
.2%
67.3%

Employment
―Employed never in 1997‖
―Employed often in 1997‖

68.4%
3.6%
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parallel measures of conflict exposure in these two groups, which serves as one indicator of
evidence of the distinctiveness of the two conflicts.
As for the prior analyses done separately on the two data sets, Barber & Olsen (2009)
used both exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses (with data for time periods 2 and 3, i.e.,
during the conflict) and concluded that the 19 exposure items loaded on to four factors, which
they labeled: personal victimization, school victimization, intrusion, and destroy. However,
given that the current study is not interested in differentiating types of exposure, a single scale
was created by averaging all 19 items (first separately for time periods 2 and 3 and then the
average of these two averages). Cronbach‘s alpha for this scale was .89. See table 3.2a for a list
of the items.
McCouch (2009) examined the same items for the Bosnian sample. He also found that
the items (average of time 2 and 3) loaded on four factors. However, only one of these factors
contained items with sufficient variance to be included when considering exposure to violence
for Bosnians. These four items are listed in table 3.2b (=.72). The current study will employ the
same four items averaged (across items and across time 2 and 3) as did McCouch (2009).

Identity
Identity was assessed using several different measures meant to encompass the multifaceted definition of identity from a socio-cultural perspective. Items assessing identity
consolidation, civic investment, and cultural and religious commitment were all used to create a
holistic view of identity formation for Palestinian and Bosnian youth.
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Table 3.2a Measure of Exposure to Violence (Palestinians)
In each of the following time periods, how often did enemy soldiers do the following:
1. Never
4. 11-20 times
2. Once
5. 21-50 times
3. 2-10 times
6. More than 50 times
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
m.
n.
o.
p.
q.
r.
s.

Verbally abuse you
Hit or kick you
Break one or more of your bones
Shoot at you with bullets
Hit you with bullets
Shoot at you with tear gas
Imprison you
Torture you
Raid your home
Raid the home of a neighbor
Demolish your home
Demolish the home of a neighbor
Beat/humiliate your father in front of you
Beat/humiliate the father of a neighbor in front of you
Kill a family member
Kill a neighbor
Raid your school
Shoot tear gas into your school
Close your school

Table 3.2b Exposure to Violence (Bosnians)
In each of the following time periods, how often did enemy soldiers do the following:
1. Never
4. 11-20 times
2. Once
5. 21-50 times
3. 2-10 times
6. More than 50 times
a.
b.
c.
d.

Shoot at you with bullets
Demolish the home of a neighbor
Kill a neighbor
Close your school
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Table 3.3 Identity Consolidation
To what extent do the following statements describe you now?
(1. Not at all like you, 2. Not much like you, 3. Somewhat like you, 4. Like you, 5. Very
much like you)
a. I have a clear vision of what I want out of life
b. I stand up for what I believe even in the face of adversity
c. I am not getting anywhere or accomplishing anything
d. I have found my place in the world
e. I wish I would have lived my life differently
f. I am satisfied with my life, work, and accomplishments
g. I am uncertain about what I‘m going to do with my life
h. I consider myself to be an adult
i. I feel I have matured fully
j. I know where I stand on world issues

Identity Consolidation. In this study, nine items related to identity formation were
included. The items came from the Measures of Psychosocial Development Scale (Hawley,
1988). Youth responded to ten items given the stem ―To what extent to the following statements
describe you now?‖ Response options ranged from 1 not at all like you to 5 very much like you.
A complete list of items for this measure is available in table 3.3.
Community Engagement. The survey included a set of fourteen items that were written to
assess the youths‘ community engagement after the conflict, including civic, political, and
religious involvement. Community engagement can be used to indicate the social and collective
identity formation of youths during the conflict. Level of community engagement reveals the
social roles adolescents are filling as well as elements of collective identity, such as social
embeddedness (the amount of possible exposure to certain social activities), and notably
behavioral involvement. Behavioral involvement is viewed by collective identity theorists as a
manifestation and expression of identity itself (Ashmore et al., 2004). For the Palestinian sample
in particular, religious and political identity may play a significant role. Youth responded to
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Table 3.4 Community Engagement Scale
During the past year, how often have you done the following things?
(1. Never, 2. Rarely, 3. Occasionally, 4. Often, 5. Very often)
a. Attended meetings or musical events at a political group‘s headquarters
b. Attended seminars about political issues
c. Participated in other political events such as ______
d. Volunteered as a teacher
e. Volunteered to help the disabled
f. Did other civic service voluntary work, such as ______
g. Helped to teach the Koran or Bible to others
h. Listened to religious tapes
i. Did other religiously oriented activities, such as ______
j. Pray alone
k. Go to Mosque/Church to pray
l. Read in the Koran or Bible
m. Think seriously about religion
n. Talk about religion with friends
items based on the stem ―During the past year, how often have you done the following things?‖
Responses were given on a 5-point scale from 1 never, to 5 very often. A complete list of items
for this measure is available in table 3.4.
Social Initiative. Five items from the 13-item social initiative scale (Barber & Erikson,
2001) were used to more generally identify connection to one‘s social environment, including
peer and adult relationships. These same five items were used successfully in previous studies of
each of these samples (Barber & Olsen, 2009; McCouch, 2009). These items may reveal how
connected an individual feels to her/his community and social groups. Positive collective identity
formation, an integral part of the whole person, is accomplished through positive relationships
with the group. By assessing connection to social environment, attachment and interdependence
as defined by the collective identity are also assessed. Youth responded to items given the stem,
―How true are the following statements of you?‖ Responses were on a 5-point rating scale from

50
Table 3.5 Social Initiative Scale
How true are the following statements for you now?
(1. Never/almost never true, 2. Seldom/rarely, 3. Occasionally/sometimes, 4. Often/usually,
5. Very often/always true)
a. I share feelings and ideas with friends
b. I share feelings and ideas with older adults in the community
c. I help friends who might need assistance
d. I ask questions of adults when I need advice
e. I express liking and caring for my friends

1, never/almost never true, to 5, very often/always true. A complete list of items for this measure
is available in table 3.5.
Principle axis exploratory factor analysis with oblimin rotation produced three factors
(See table 3.6 for factor analysis, table 3.7 for factor correlations). Three items were dropped
because of their inconsistencies in loadings between data sets. These items were ―I am uncertain
about what I‘m going to do with my life,‖ ―I wish I would have lived my life differently,‖ and
―Attended meetings or musical events at a political group‘s headquarters.‖ The remaining items
loaded on three distinct factors, labeled here as: (1) consolidated/social identity, consisting of the
remaining identity consolidation items and the five social initiative items); (2) religious identity
(―Helped to teach the Koran or Bible to others,‖ ―Listened to religious tapes,‖ ―Did other
religiously oriented activities, such as _____,‖ ―Pray alone,‖ ―Go to Mosque/Church to pray,‖
―Read in the Koran or Bible,‖ ―Think seriously about religion,‖ and ―talk about religion with
friends‖; and (3) civic identity (―Attended seminars about political issues,‖ ―Participated in other
political events such as ______,‖ ―Volunteered as a teacher,‖ ―Volunteered to help the disabled,‖
―Did other civic service voluntary work, such as ______‖).
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Scales for consolidated/social identity and religious identity were created by averaging
the responses of the respective items. The scale for civic identity was created by recoding each
‗never‘ response as ‗0‘ and all other responses as ‗1‘ and then summing across items, because of
low variability. Reliability coefficients for the three scales are: pal=.73, bos=.87 for
consolidated/social identity, pal=.71, bos=.89 for religious identity, and pal=.72, bos=.68 for
civic identity.

Psychosocial Functioning
Two psychosocial outcome measures were employed: negative self-perception and
antisocial behavior.
Negative Self-Perception. Negative self-perception was assessed in the survey with 5
items from Rosenberg‘s Self-esteem Inventory (Rosenberg, 1965) and two items from the
Depression subscale of the Child Behavior Checklist – Youth Self Report (Achenbach &
Edelbrock, 1987). See Table 3.8 for a full listing of the items. The development and maintenance
of positive self-esteem is one of the goals of identity formation (Vignoles et al., 2006). In
addition, collective identity theorists posit that a stigmatized group may experience lower selfesteem, but that higher collective identity may buffer the negative effects of that stigmatization
(Ashmore et al., 2004). It would follow therefore, that less negative self-perception is an
expression of positive identity formation on both individual and collective levels. All items were
assessed with the stem: ―Please mark how much you agree with these statements about yourself
now.‖ Responses ranged from 1 strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree.

52
Table 3.6 Factor Loadings for Civic, Religious, and Consolidated/Social Identity Items
Identity Dimensions
1.

2.

3.

Consol/Soc

Religious

Civic

Items

Factor 1

Factor 2

Bos
.66

Pal
.52

Share feelings/ideas w/older
adults
Help friends who need assistance

.58

.47

.71

.54

Ask questions adults when need
advice
Express liking/caring for my
friends
Clear vision of what want out of
life
Stand up for beliefs in adversity

.68

.50

.69

.53

.72

.53

.74

.50

Not getting anywhere

.34

.05

Found my place in the world

.64

.46

Satisfied with life, work, accomp

.61

.33

I consider myself to be an adult

.72

.48

I feel I have matured fully

.69

.55

I know where I stand on world
issues
Pray alone-after conflict

.49

.42

Factor 3

Bos

Pal

Bos

Pal

.85

.33

Mosque to pray-after conflict

.84

.34

Read Koran/Bible-after conflict

.83

.73

Thought religion-after conflict

.78

.72

Talked religion-after conflict

.62

.68

Teach Koran/Bible
Listen religious tapes

.69
.72

.42
.55

Other religious activities

.69

.47

Political seminars

.37

.62

Other political events

.41

.70

Share feelings/ideas with friends
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Table 3.6 Continued
Items

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Volunteered as teacher

.65

.37

Volunteered disabled

.56

.55

.68

.62

Eigenvalues

Other voluntary work
7.03

4.66

4.27

2.70

2.14

2.38

Cumulative % Var

25.12

15.32

39.84

23.46

45.62

30.04

Table 3.7 Factor Correlations
1.
1.

Consol/Soc

2.

Religious

.22

3.

Identity

.24

Palestinian, Bosnian

2.

3.

.20

.15
.16

.09
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Table 3.8 Negative Self-Perception
Please mark how much you agree with these statements about yourself now.
(1. Strongly disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Neither disagree nor agree, 4. Agree, 5. Strongly agree)
a. I am able to do things as well as most people
b. I certainly feel useless at times
c. I take a positive attitude toward myself
d. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure
e. I feel that I‘m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others
f. I feel lonely
g. I feel sad

These items were previously analyzed in both data sets. Using the Palestinian data,
Barber & Olsen (2009) determined a measure of self-derogation that consisted of two items, ―I
certainly feel useless at times,‖ and ―All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.‖ (They
used the items ―I feel lonely,‖ and ―I feel sad‖ as a separate measure of depression to be able to
provide a comparison to other studies that concentrated on depression.) Using the Bosnian data,
McCouch (2009) created a measure of ―depression‖ which included all four items, as well as the
items: ―I am more depressed,‖ and ―I am not getting anywhere‖ (=.87). For the present study, it
was appropriate to define a parallel measure across both data sets given that the same model was
being tested in both sets. Thus, in order to provide direct comparability across data sets, a fouritem measure was created It was a combination of two items from the self-derogation scale
(Barber & Olsen, 2009) and two items from the depression scale (McCouch, 2009). The four
items are: ―I certainly feel useless at times,‖ ―All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure,‖
―I feel lonely,‖ and ―I feel sad.‖ Cronbach‘s alphas were: pal=.70, bos=.83.
Antisocial Behavior. Seven items were used to assess antisocial behavior in the two
populations. This scale was adapted from common measures of antisocial behavior in youth
(Elliott, Huizinga, & Ageton, 1985). Items were grouped into two categories, with two items
pertaining to substance abuse/alcohol use and five items pertaining to theft or vandalism. Youth
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Table 3.9 Antisocial Behavior Scale
On how many days during the past 6 months have you done the following things?
(1. Never, 2. Once, 3. Rarely, 4. Occasionally, 5. Often)
a. Purposely damaged or destroyed property
b. Used alcoholic beverages
c. Used tobacco
d. Stolen or tried to steal something of low value
e. Stolen or tried to steal something of high value
f. Hit or threatened to hit someone
g. Stayed at home all of the time

responded to items given the stem, ―On how many days during the past 6 months have you done
the following things?‖ Response options ranged from 1, never, to 5, often. A complete list of
items for this measure is available in table 3.9.
These items were analyzed previously in both data sets, with both sets of analyses finding
that antisocial behavior separated into two factors: (1) substance use (pal=.55, bos=.73; Note: In
the Palestinian data, an additional item ―Attended beach parties with female dancers‖ loaded
with the substance use items) and (2) a second factor, labeled ―theft/vandalism‖ (pal=.64) by
Barber & Olsen (2009) and ―criminality‖ (bos=.88) by McCouch (2009). Again for reasons of
comparability across this study‘s analyses, four items were selected for use in the present
analyses: ―Stolen or tried to steal something of low value,‖ ―Stolen or tried to steal something of
high value,‖ ―Purposely damaged or destroyed property,‖ and ―Hit or threatened to hit someone.‖
Because descriptive analyses revealed that variability in these items is low, the items were
dichotomized (‗0‘ for no expressed antisocial behavior, else ‗1‘) and summed then the summed
totals were dichotomized as well, (‗0‘ for no expressed antisocial behavior, else ‗1‘).
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Analysis Plan
Hypotheses will be tested first with correlational analyses and then with multiple
regression analyses. Because of the dichotomous nature of the antisocial outcome measure,
logistic regression will be used in all tests involving this variable. In total, 6 models will be run
in each data set (i.e., three hypothesized associations x 2 outcome variables). Prior to running the
relevant analyses, a missing values analysis was conducted using Maximum Likelihood
Estimation, a commonly accepted method of imputation.
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Results

Means
Means and standard deviations for all variables were comparable across groups except for
civic identity. Palestinians reported higher civic identity (M=2.29, SD=1.69) than did Bosnians,
who reported quite low levels of civic identity (M=0.65, SD=1.24) Means and standard
deviations for each group can be found in table 4.1.

Bivariate Correlations
Conflict Exposure and Outcome Variables. For Bosnians, the correlations between
conflict exposure and the outcomes variables were significant and in the predicted direction, that
is, positively with negative self-perception (r=.276, p.001) and positively with antisocial
behavior (r=.091, p.05). For Palestinians, the correlation between conflict exposure and
antisocial behavior was also significant and in the expected positive direction (r=.130, p.001).
The relationship between conflict exposure and negative self-perception was significant, but in
the opposite direction than hypothesized, such that conflict exposure was correlated with lower
reported negative self-perception (r=-.074, p.05). See table 4.2.

Table 4.1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges of Study Variables
Bosnian (N=522)

Palestinian (N=917)

Mean
2.52

SD
1.05

Range
0.85-5.63

Mean
2.19

SD
0.68

Range
1.00-4.82

Civic Identity

0.65

1.24

0.00-5.00

2.29

1.69

0.00-5.00

Religious Identity

2.58

1.01

1.00-5.00

3.12

0.77

1.00-5.00

Consol/Social Identity

3.64

0.69

1.31-5.00

3.79

0.54

1.31-5.00

Negative Self- Perception

2.25

0.89

1.00-5.00

2.50

0.84

0.87-5.00

Antisocial

0.32

0.47

0.00-1.00

0.39

0.49

0.00-1.00

Conflict Exposure

58
Conflict Exposure and Identity. In the Bosnian data, conflict exposure was not
significantly associated with religious identity (r=.057, p.05), but was associated significantly,
and in the expected direction, with the other two dimensions of identity: with lower civic identity
(r=-.132, p.01) and with lower consolidated/social identity (r=-.288, p.001).
In the Palestinian data, conflict exposure was significantly, positively associated (as
hypothesized) with all three identity variables: higher civic identity (r=.308, p.001); higher
religious identity (r=.107, p.001); and higher consolidated/social identity (r=.168, p.001). See
table 4.2.
Identity and Outcomes. Bivariate correlations were conducted between all three identity
measures and both outcome measures across both populations. For Bosnians, neither civic
identity (r=-.004, ns) nor religious identity (r=-.007, ns) was significantly correlated with
negative self-perception. Higher consolidated/social identity was associated with less negative
self-perception (r=-.387, p.001). For Bosnians, civic identity was not significantly associated
with antisocial behavior (r=.081, ns). However, both religious identity and consolidated/social
identity were significantly correlated with antisocial behavior in the expected direction such that
higher religious identity was associated with less antisocial behavior (r=-.169, p.001) and
higher consolidated/social identity was associated with less antisocial behavior (r=-.152,
p.001). See table 4.2 for correlations between identity and outcome for Bosnians.
For Palestinians, civic identity, religious identity, and consolidated/social identity were
all significantly correlated with negative self-perception in the expected direction: higher civic
identity was associated with less negative self-perception (r=-.118, p.001); higher religious
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Table 4.2 Correlations between Study Variables
1.
1. Conflict Exposure
2. Civic Identity
3. Relig Identity
4. Consol/Soc Identity
5. Negative Self –Perception
6. Antisocial Behavior

2.
-0.132**

.308***
.107***
.168***
-.074*
.130***

.190***
.201***
-.118***
.131***

3.
0.057
.179***
.241***
-.112***
-0.023

4.

5.

6.

-.288***
.124**
.219***

.276***
-0.004
-0.007
-.387***

.091*
0.081
-.169***
-.152***
.133**

-.315***
-.102**

.130***

(Bosnian, Palestinian; 2 tailed p-values, *p.05, **p.01, ***p.001)

identity was associated with less negative self-perception (r=-.112, p.001); higher
consolidated/social identity was associated with less negative self-perception (r=-.315, p.001).
For Palestinians, the relationship between religious identity and antisocial behavior was
non-significant (r=-.02, ns). Consolidated/social identity was significantly, negatively associated,
as hypothesized, with lower antisocial behavior (r=-.102, p.01). Contrary to the hypothesis,
higher civic identity was significantly, positively associated with higher antisocial behavior
(r=.131, p.001). See table 4.2 for correlations between all three identity measures and both
outcome measures for Palestinians.

Regression Analyses
Hypotheses 1 asserted that in both samples conflict exposure would be positively
associated with negative outcomes (negative self-perception and antisocial behavior). Hypothesis
2 asserted that in both samples identity would be negatively associated with the same negative
outcomes. These hypotheses were tested using multiple regression analyses for the negative selfperception variable (regressed simultaneously on conflict exposure and identity) and logistic
regression for the antisocial behavior variable (also regressed simultaneously on conflict
exposure and identity). These analyses were repeated three times, once for each dimension of
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identity: civic identity (Model 1), religious identity (Model 2), and consolidated/social identity
(Model 3).
Hypothesis 3 asserted that conflict exposure would be related positively with identity for
Palestinian youth and negatively with identity for Bosnian youth. Since only two variables are
involved in testing this hypothesis, the bivariate correlations will be used to document this
association.

Negative Self-Perception
A summary of the regression results with negative self-perception as the dependent
variable is presented in table 4.3.
Civic Identity, Conflict Exposure, and Negative Self-Perception. As can be seen from the

Table 4.3 Summary of Analyses Regressing Negative Self-Perception on Conflict Exposure and
Identity Dimensions
Bosnian
Model 1

Palestinian

r



t

r



T

0.28***

0.28

6.58**

-0.07*

-0.04

-1.19

-0.004

0.03

0.77

-.12***

-0.10

-3.05**

.28***

0.28

6.56**

-0.07*

-0.06

-1.89

-0.01

-0.02

-0.54

-0.13***

-0.10

-3.19**

Exposure

.28***

0.18

4.31**

-0.07*

-0.02

-0.67

Consol/Soc Identity

-.39***

-0.33

-8.08**

-.31***

-0.31

-9.77**

(FBos=21.68***, FPal=7.19**
RBos=.278, RPal=.125)
Exposure
Civic Identity

Model 2

(FBos=21.51***, FPal=7.62**
RBos=.277, RPal=.128)
Exposure
Religious Identity

Model 3

(FBos=56.67***, FPal=50.55**
RBos=.423, RPal=.316)

(2 tailed p-value, *p.05, **p.01, ***p.001)
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Civic
Identity

Bos=-.13, Pal=.31*

Bos=.03, Pal=-.10

Conflict
Exposure

Negative SelfPerception
Bos=.28, Pal=-.041

*path between conflict exposure and identity is the bivariate correlation

Figure 4.1 Conflict Exposure, Civic Identity, and Negative Self-Perception

results for Model 1 assessing civic identity, the regression equations were significant for both
samples (Bosnia: F=21.68, p.001; Palestine: F=7.19, p.01). As to specific effects of the
predictors, in the Bosnian data, conflict exposure was significantly related to negative selfperception (expo=.28, t=6.58, p.01) but civic identity was not (civic=.03, t=.77, ns, consistent
with the non-significant bivariate correlation). The reverse was true in the Palestinian data where
civic identity uniquely (that is, above and beyond the effect of conflict exposure) significantly
predicted negative self-perception (expo=-.04, t=-1.19, p.05) but conflict exposure did not
(civic=-.10, t=-3.05, p.01).
As was reported in the correlation results above, conflict exposure was significantly
associated with civic identity, positively for Palestinian youth (r=.308, p.001) and negatively
for Bosnian youth (r=-.132, p.01). For ease of assimilating this set of findings, a graphic
representation is presented in Figure 4.1.
Religious Identity, Conflict Exposure, and Negative Self-Perception. As can be seen in
the results of Model 2 assessing religious identity (Table 4.4), the same pattern of findings is
evident as for Model 1. The regression equations were significant for both samples: Bosnians
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Bos= .06, Pal=.11*

ReligiousIdentity

Bos=-.02, Pal=-.10

Conflict
Exposure

Negative Self
Perception
Bos=.28, Pal=-.06

* path between conflict exposure and identity is the bivariate correlation

Figure 4.2 Conflict Exposure, Religious Identity, and Negative Self-Perception

(F=21.51, p.001); Palestinians (F=.762, p.01). For Bosnian youth, it was conflict exposure
that significantly predicted negative self-perception (expo=.28, t=6.56, p.01) but not religious
identity (relig=-.02, t=-.54, ns; consistent with the non-significant bivariate correlation). For
Palestinian youth, it was religious identity that uniquely predicted negative self-perception
(relig=-.10, t=-3.19, p.01) but conflict exposure did not (expo=-.06, t=-1.89, ns).
As reported in the correlation findings above, conflict exposure was unrelated to religious
identity in the Bosnian data (r=.057, ns) but was positively associated with religious identity in
the Palestinian data (r=.107, p.001). A graphic summary of this set of findings is presented in
figure 4.2.
Consolidated/Social Identity, Conflict Exposure, and Negative Self-Perception. As can be
seen from the findings for Model 3 assessing consolidated/social identity, again, regression
equations for both samples were significant: Bosnian (F=56.67, p.001); Palestinian (F=50.55,
p.001). Further, for Bosnian youth, both conflict exposure (expo=.18, t=4.31, p.01) and
identity uniquely predicted negative self-perception (super=-.33, t=-8.08, p.01). As was the case
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Bos=-.29, Pal=.17*

Consolidated/
Social
Identity

Bos=-.33, Pal=-.31

Conflict
Exposure

Negative Self
Perception
Bos=.18, Pal=-.02

* path between conflict exposure and identity is the bivariate correlation

Figure 4.3 Conflict Exposure, Consolidated/Social Identity, and Negative Self-Perception

for the other dimensions of identity, for Palestinian youth identity uniquely predicted negative
self-perception super=-.31, t=-9.77, p.01) but conflict exposure did not (expo=-.02, t=-.67, ns).
As for the association between conflict exposure and identity, the correlations revealed
that conflict exposure significantly predicted consolidated/social identity in both samples,
negatively for Bosnian youth (r=-.288, p.001) and positively for Palestinian youth (r=.168,
p.001). A graphic summary of this set of findings is presented in figure 4.3.

Antisocial Behavior
The results for the logistic regression analyses focusing on antisocial behavior are
presented in table 4.4.
Civic Identity, Conflict Exposure and Antisocial Behavior. As can be seen in table 4.5 for
the findings of Model 1 assessing civic identity; for Bosnians only exposure was significant in
predicting antisocial behavior (Bexpo=.19, Wald=4.73, p.05; Bcivic=.24, Wald=.79, ns). For
Palestinians, both exposure (Bexpo=.29, Wald=8.03, p.01) and civic identity (Bcivic=.12,
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Wald=8.57, p.01) significantly predicted antisocial behavior. For a graphic representation of
this model, see figure 4.4.
Religious Identity, Conflict Exposure, and Antisocial Behavior. As can be seen in table
4.5, when considering Model 2 that included religious identity, for Bosnians, both exposure
(Bexpo=.22, Wald=5.49, p.05) and religious identity (Brelig=-.39, Wald=15.67, p.001)
significantly predicted antisocial behavior. For Palestinians, only exposure significantly
predicted antisocial behavior (Bexpo=.4, Wald=15.85, p.001; Brelig=-.09, Wald=1.24, ns). For a
graphic representation of this model, see figure 4.5.

Bos=-.13, Pal=.31*

Civic Identity

BBos=-.39, BPal=.12

Conflict
Exposure

Antisocial
Behavior
BBos= .22, BPal=.29

* path between conflict exposure and identity is the bivariate correlation

Figure 4.4 Model 1: Conflict Exposure, Civic Identity, and Antisocial Behavior

Bos= .06, Pal=.11*

ReligiosityIdentity

BBos=.24, BPal=-.09

Conflict
Exposure

Antisocial
Behavior
BBos=.19, BPal=.40

* path between conflict exposure and identity is the bivariate correlation

Figure 4.5 Model 2: Conflict Exposure, Religious Identity, and Antisocial Behavior
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Table 4.4 Antisocial Behavior Regressed on Models
Bosnian

Palestinian
95% CI

95% CI

r

B

S.E.

Wald (F)

Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

R

B

S.E.

Wald (F)

Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

Conflict Exposure

.09*

0.19

0.09

4.73*

1.22

1.02

1.45

.13***

0.29

0.10

8.03**

1.35

1.09

1.66

Civic Identity

0.08

0.24

0.27

0.79

1.28

0.74

2.19

.13***

0.12

0.04

8.57**

1.13

1.04

1.23

Conflict Exposure

.09*

0.22

0.09

5.49*

1.24

1.04

1.49

.13***

0.40

0.10

15.85***

1.49

1.23

1.82

Religious Identity

-.17***

-0.39

0.09

15.67***

0.67

0.55

0.82

-0.02

-0.09

0.09

1.24

0.90

0.76

1.08

Conflict Exposure

.09*

0.11

0.09

1.32

1.11

0.93

1.34

.13***

0.46

0.10

19.83***

1.58

1.29

1.94

-.15***

-0.43

0.14

8.84**

0.65

0.49

0.86

-.10**

-0.49

0.13

14.21***

0.61

0.48

0.79

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3
Consol/Soc Identity
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Consolidated/Social Identity, Conflict Exposure and Antisocial Behavior. As can be seen
in table 4.5 for Model 3, which included consolidated/social identity, for Bosnians, only
consolidated/social identity significantly predicted antisocial behavior (Bexpo=.11, Wald=1.32, ns;
Bconsolsoc=-.43, Wald=8.84, p.01). In the Palestinian data, both exposure (Bexpo=.46, Wald=19.83,
p.001) and consolidated/social identity (Bconsolsoc=-.49, Wald=14.21, p.001) significantly
predicted antisocial behavior. For a graphic representation of this model, see figure 4.6.

Summary
The results largely supported the hypotheses. In most cases exposure was related to more
negative outcomes for both Bosnians and Palestinians. In addition, in most cases, identity factors
were correlated with less negative outcomes for both groups. Finally, there was an observed
directional difference in the relationship between exposure and identity between the groups, such
that for Bosnians exposure was negatively correlated with identity formation and for Palestinians
exposure was positively correlated with identity formation.

Bos=-.29, Pal=.17*

Consolidated/
Social
Identity

BBos=-.43, BPal=-.49

Conflict
Exposure

Antisocial
Behavior
BBos=.11, BPal=.46

* path between conflict exposure and identity is the bivariate correlation

Figure 4.6 Model 3: Conflict Exposure, Consolidated/Social Identity, and Antisocial Behavior
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Discussion
The purpose of this study was to advance the understanding of the impact of political
conflict on youth. Past research has focused on the direct effects of youths‘ experience with
political conflict on their psychological, and sometimes social, functioning, but it has paid little
attention to the mechanisms that might explain those direct effects. This study focused on youth
identity as one potential mechanism. Identity was a logical area of study given that it has been
recognized as a primary and universal task for individuals in the second decade of life (Erikson,
1988). Various theoretical approaches suggest that identity is influenced by the social, cultural,
ethnic and political realms of a youths‘ experience. Thus, it seemed sensible to expect that
youths‘ experiences with political conflict might well impact how they come to think of
themselves.
In forming hypotheses, the thesis built on the growing realization that conflicts are
experienced very differently by youth, and this having largely to do with the degree to which
youth are able to make sense of or embrace the conflict (Barber, 2009b). This distinctiveness of
political conflicts is particularly evident when considering the experience of Bosnian and
Palestinian youths with their respective wars or political conflicts – with one group (Bosnians)
unable to predict, understand, or participate in a war that descended upon them, and the other
group (Palestinians) eagerly embracing a clearly defined struggle. Because of the universal and
central role of identity in youth functioning there did not appear to be any reason to expect
differences in the two populations as to the benefits of identity achievement, nor to expect that
exposure to violence would be other than negative for both groups. However, the basic
differences in the nature of the conflict experience lead to the thesis‘ central hypothesis that the
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experiences of these two groups of youths with political conflict would differentially impact their
identity. Specifically, it was hypothesized that exposure to political conflict would negatively
impact identity for Bosnian youth, but positively for Palestinian youth.

Direct Effects of Conflict Exposure on Youth Functioning (Hypothesis 1)
The results from this study partially supported the hypothesis that conflict exposure and
negative outcome would be positively correlated. For Bosnian youths, conflict exposure was
associated with higher negative self-perception and higher antisocial behavior. Exposure was
also associated with higher antisocial behavior for the Palestinian youths. These results
corroborate previous findings that exposure is associated with more negative outcomes,
regardless of which conflict is being investigated.
However, the finding that conflict exposure was associated with lower negative selfperception in the Palestinian data is not consistent with past research, specifically with Barber‘s
studies of Palestinian youths (1999, 2001) which found that higher exposure was associated with
higher depression. The discrepancy might be explained by the high correspondence (e.g., .77) in
the Palestinian data under study here between conflict exposure and youth political activism
during the Intifada, which, when isolated from conflict exposure was associated with positive or
less negative youth psychosocial functioning (Barber & Olsen,2009).Thus, it is possible that the
conflict exposure variable used in this study is not a ―pure‖ exposure variable, rather that it
carries with it the effects of activism (i.e., youth may have experienced harsh treatment because
of their activist behaviors).
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Effects of Identity on Youth Functioning (Hypothesis 2)
The second hypothesis posited that youth identity would be negatively associated with
poor youth functioning. This hypothesis was essentially supported in that the various dimensions
of identity investigated in this study were consistently related, although not in every case, with
both outcomes in both samples, and, with one exception, always in the expected direction. These
results support theory proposed by Erikson (1988) and Marcia (1966) that higher identity
formation, regardless of circumstance, is associated with less negative outcomes. Erikson‘s
(1988) assertion that identity formation is an essential dimension of healthy individual
development is further supported by this inverse relationship. It is not clear why, contrary to all
of the other results, the correlation between civic identity and antisocial behavior in the
Palestinian data was positive.
The consistency across civic identity and religious identity, which are closely tied to
group membership in these populations, and consolidated/social identity—which is inclusive of
social competence—reveals the importance of group identity in addition to individual identity.
The results support the idea that amongst these populations who were reliant on their own group
for protection and survival, group identification and, by extension, the drive toward a sense of
belongingness was important to their well-being (Tajfel, 1982; Tong & Chang, 2008).
Finally, although not perfectly consistent, the pattern of results in the regression analyses
reported for negative self-perception suggests that for the Palestinian youth, identity was a
particularly salient predictor of negative self-perceptions. When paired with conflict exposure in
the same model it predicted unique variance in negative self-perceptions. The results of the
logistic regressions focusing on antisocial behavior were different. Again, while not perfectly
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consistent, the pattern appeared to be that both conflict exposure and identity added unique
explanation of variance in antisocial behavior in both populations. Thus, there may be some
evidence that for Palestinian youth in this sample, identity was particularly important for
perceptions of self.

Differential Impact of Conflict on Identity (Hypothesis 3)
Finally, the third hypothesis, that conflict exposure would have opposing effects on
identity for Palestinians and Bosnians was largely supported by the results. For Bosnian youths,
conflict exposure predicted lower levels of two of the three dimensions of identity (civic identity
and consolidated/social identity). For the Palestinian youths, conflict exposure was associated
with higher levels of all three dimensions of identity.
This was a bold hypothesis in that it posited that conflict exposure could be associated
with positive (or less negative) functioning of (Palestinian) youths, an association that is contrary
to most past research. Importantly, however, that research has not investigated identity as an
outcome, for which theory can be read to actually imply such a positive effect. For example,
Schachter (2004) theorized that identity emerges in relation to the needs of the individual as
determined by the complexities of the environment. Specifically, Bosnian youth grew up in a
conflict environment which afforded them very little opportunity for engagement and
participation. Palestinian youth grew up in an environment which not only afforded opportunity
for engagement in the conflict, but encouraged participation. Palestinians stated that they
believed conflict was, ―for the good for all of the people; to save all the people‖ (Barber, 2009b,
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295), while Bosnians described conflict as creating a sense that, ―everything had been turned
upside down,‖ (Barber 2009b, 288).
Ethier & Deaux (1994) indicated that when challenges to cultural identity arise, youth
who have a coherent conception of their own cultural identity take steps to strengthen cultural
identity, as a result strengthening overall identity and positive self-esteem. Youth who have a
weak understanding of cultural identity experience further fragmentation within their cultural
and overall sense of identity, experience higher stress and exhibit lower self-esteem. Palestinian
youth see purpose and take responsibility for the conflict. These results are also consistent with
collective identity theory‘s postulate that identity is an ―emotionally laden sense of belonging to
a distinctive, bounded group, involving both a felt solidarity and oneness with fellow group
members and a felt difference from or antipathy to specified outsiders‖ (Brubaker & Cooper,
2000, 19). Collective identities develop within social context, are spurred by experience and
applied or assumed characteristics of an individual (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

Limitations
This study was limited by a reliance on previously collected survey data from the two
populations. The data were retrospective, and some of the questions were very specific as to the
experiences of youth during certain time periods. Recall ability of the youth surveyed is a
limitation.
Aside from such common problems inherent in reliance on survey design, this study was
constrained also by the specific survey items and scales that were available in the data. The only
items in the original study which applied explicitly to identity were a subset of ten items
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pertaining to identity consolidation. A more complete identity scale which incorporated political
and religious aspects as well as social aspects had to be constructed from other available item
sets. However, these items were not designed with identity in mind, thus they are questionable
measures of identity formation. An example of a problem with scaling of identity is the civic
identity scale which defined identity by civic engagement, of which the Bosnian youth reported
very little. Aggregating across the items alleviated the problem somewhat but still this measure
of identity for the Bosnian sample was particularly weak.
Attempting to compare two populations with the same set of items was another
limitation. Previous research has shown that it is not possible to create a comparable scale of
items out of the available exposure items (Barber, 2008). Although this is a limitation in that the
items considered for the entire survey were not identical, it also helps to solidify the point that
conflicts are not uniform, and cannot be treated as such. Additionally, the primary focus of this
study was to concentrate on comparing across two populations of youths with varied conflict
experiences and the analyses, therefore, did not include other key variables, such as gender.
Amongst some populations there is reason to believe that there would be a substantially different
experience between males and females, particularly in opportunity to engage actively in the
conflict, as well as roles enacted when engaged in conflict. Males may have more opportunity to
engage in outright conflict while females may provide more supportive roles in conflict
environments. In the future, gender should be further explored to understand how males and
females experience and are influenced by conflict and identity, comparatively. The current data
set offers the possibility of including gender as a moderating variable, for example.
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Low variability in some of the study variables was also a limitation of the study. Low
levels of antisocial behavior, for example, were reported by both Bosnian and Palestinian youth.

Summary and Future Directions
Despite the limitations, the study does make a contribution to the literature. Firstly this
study highlights the distinctiveness of conflict environments and supports previous analyses that
indicate that the Palestinian and Bosnian conflicts were experienced by youth differently, both
structurally and psychologically (Barber & Olsen, 2009). Most importantly, the study illustrated
the importance of identity, particularly as defined socially, collectively, and religiously, not just
to youth well-being, but that it can be impacted quite differently depending on the nature of the
political conflict youth experience.
Information gained through this study is applicable to the development of programs
serving youth in high risk environments. By understanding the characteristics of a successful
adolescent living in a conflict environment, it may be possible to nurture these factors in all
adolescents, particularly internal and external aspects of identity. Although the statistics are
unclear about the overall rates of positive and negative psychological outcomes, there remains a
need for positive programming and attention to these youth populations. Further, the results of
this study could have implications for youths in other high risk environments such as poverty or
violence exposure outside of war.
Future directions for the research should include an assessment of activism along with
exposure. It is clear, given Barber & Olsen‘s (2009) research on Palestinian youths, that activism
is integral to their conflict experience and should not be overlooked when considering influences
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of psychosocial outcomes for youth. In addition, this study emphasizes the need for surveys
constructed with specific attention to identity measures. There are available ethnic and collective
identity measures (i.e. Phinney & Ong, 2001) that should be utilized and refined. These measures
would most likely provide a better picture of political and religious identity than the items
selected from this study.
Other individual factors, such as gender (as noted above), family background, or years of
education should be included to determine if these individual characteristics have an influence on
the experience of conflict exposure or identity formation. In particular, gender would be of note
because previous research (i.e. Rosner et al., 2003) has shown differences in outcomes between
males and females. This may be due in part to participation rates, as males would have greater
opportunity to actively engage in the conflict, especially within more conservative environments.
Women also have different social and civil roles in most conflict situations, not to be on the front
lines of conflict, but acting as support systems for those men who are on the forefront of conflict.
Amongst Palestinians, however, there is less likely to be a discrepancy—previous research
shows high activism rates regardless of gender (Barber, 2009c). Still, looking at gender may
reveal more about the relationship between conflict exposure and outcomes, as well as how
individual factors contribute to the development of identity and its relationship with more
positive psychosocial outcomes. Gender itself has been considered a type of collective identity
(Coleman & Lowe, 2007; Simon & Klandermans, 2001), and should be explored as such.
Finally, identity formation must be considered in a holistic manner, encompassing both
individual/internal and group/external perspectives. No one perspective has been shown by this
study to preclude the other, therefore it is important to utilize research methods that incorporate
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both. This study attempted to present the necessity of a broad interpretation of identity, and
encourages its continuation.
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